Hacking a counterfeit money detector for fun and non-profit
In Spain we have a saying “Hecha la ley, hecha la trampa” which basically means there will always be a way to circumvent a restriction. In fact, that is pretty much what hacking is all about. It seems the idea of ‘counterfeiting’ appeared at the same time as legitimate money. The Wikipedia page for Counterfeit money is a fascinating read that helps explain its effects. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Counterfeit_money Nowadays every physical currency implements security measures to prevent counterfeiting. Some counterfeits can be detected with a naked eye,…
NCSAM – Lucas Apa explains the effects of games cheating, 3D modeling, and psychedelic trance music on IT security
I got involved with computers in 1994 when I was six years old. I played games for some years without even thinking about working in the security field. My first contact with the security field was when I started to create “trainers” to cheat on games by manipulating their memory. This led me to find many tutorials related to assembly and cracking in 2001, when my security research began. The thin line of legality at that time was blurred by actions not considered illegal. This allowed an explosion…
NCSAM – Eireann Leverett on why magic is crucial
Late last week I had the pleasure of interviewing IOActive Labs CTO – Cesar Cerrudo on how he got into IT security. Today I am fortunate enough to have the pleasure of interviewing Eireann Leverett, a senior researcher for IOActive on this field and how magic played a part. IOActive: How did you get into security? Eireann: Actually, I was very slow to get security as an official title for a job, it was only really in the last few years. However, I always knew that’s…
NCSAM – an Interview with Cesar Cerrudo
Today we continue our support for National Cyber Security Awareness Month, by interviewing Cesar Cerrudo, Chief Technology Officer for IOActive Labs. Cesar provides us with some insight of how he got into IT security and why it’s important to be persistent! IOActive: How did you get into security? Cesar: I think my first hacks were when I was 10 years old or so. I modified BASIC code on CZ Spectrum games and also cheated games by loading different parts of the code from a cassette (yes not…
Strike Two for the Emergency Alerting System and Vendor Openness
Back in July I posted a rant about my experiences reporting the DASDEC issues and the problems I had getting things fixed. Some months have passed and I thought it would be a good time to take a look at how the vulnerable systems have progressed since then. Well, back then my biggest complaint was the lack of forthrightness in Monroe Electronics’ public reporting of the issues; they were treated as a marketing problem rather than a security one. The end result (at the time) was that there were…
A trip down cyber memory lane, or from C64 to #FF0000 teaming
So, it’s National Cyber Security Awareness Month, and here at IOActive we have been lining up some great content for you. Before we get to that, I was asked to put in a short post with some background on how I got to info sec, and what has been keeping me here for almost 20 years now. Brace yourselves for a trip down memory lane then :-). For me getting into security didn’t start with a particular event or decision. I’ve always been intrigued by how things worked,…
Vulnerability bureaucracy: Unchanged after 12 years
One of my tasks at IOActive Labs is to deal with vulnerabilities; report them, try to get them fixed, publish advisories, etc. This isn’t new to me. I started to report vulnerabilities something like 12 years ago and over that time I have reported hundreds of vulnerabilities – many of them found by me and by other people too. Since the early 2000’s I have encountered several problems when reporting vulnerabilities: Vendor not responding Vendor responding aggressively Vendor responding but choosing not to fix the vulnerability Vendor releasing flawed patches…
Why Vendor Openness Still Matters
When the zombies began rising from their graves in Montana it had already been over 30 days since IOActive had reported issues with Monroe Electronics DASDECS. And while it turned out in the end that the actual attacks which caused the false EAS messages to be transmitted relied on the default password never having been changed, this would have been the ideal point to publicize that there was a known issue and that there was a firmware update available, or would soon be to address this and other problems……
Why sanitize excessed equipment
My passion for cybersecurity centers on industrial controllers–PLCs, RTUs, and the other “field devices.” These devices are the interface between the integrator (e.g., HMI systems, historians, and databases) and the process (e.g., sensors and actuators). Researching this equipment can be costly because PLCs and RTUs cost thousands of dollars. Fortunately, I have an ally: surplus resellers that sell used equipment. I have been buying used equipment for a few years now. Equipment often arrives to me literally ripped from a factory floor or even a substation. Each controller…
Red Team Testing: Debunking Myths and Setting Expectations
The term “cyber” seems to be overused in every corner of the information security industry. Now there is a new buzz phrase in computer security, “red team engagements.” Supposedly (to get “cyber” on you), you can have a red team test, and it will help move your organization in the correct “cyber direction.” But what is red team testing really? And what is it not? In this post I’ll try to make some sense of this potent term. The red team concept has been around for ages. It…