INSIGHTS | September 10, 2013

Vulnerability bureaucracy: Unchanged after 12 years

One of my tasks at IOActive Labs is to deal with vulnerabilities; report them, try to get them fixed, publish advisories, etc. This isn’t new to me. I started to report vulnerabilities something like 12 years ago and over that time I have reported hundreds of vulnerabilities – many of them found by me and by other people too.

Since the early 2000’s I have encountered several problems when reporting vulnerabilities:
  • Vendor not responding
  • Vendor responding aggressively
  • Vendor responding but choosing not to fix the vulnerability
  • Vendor releasing flawed patches or didn’t patch some vulnerabilities at all
  • Vendor failing to meet deadlines agreed by themselves

It’s really sad to tell that, as of right now, 12 years later, I continue to see most (if not all) of the same problems. Not only that, but some organizations that are supposed to help and coordinate vulnerability reporting and disclosure (CERTs) are starting to fail, being non responsive and not contributing much to the effort.

This shouldn’t be a big problem if you are reporting low impact or unimportant vulnerabilities, but most of the time the team here at IOActive report critical vulnerabilities affecting systems ranging from critical infrastructure to the most popular commercial applications, OS’s, etc. used by millions of people around the world. There is a big responsibility upon us to work with the affected vendors to get the vulnerabilities fixed and thinking about how bad things could be if they are exploited.

It’s also surprising to sometimes see the tardy response from some teams that are supposed to act and respond fast such as Android security team given that Google has some strong vulnerability polices (12):

It would be nice if most vendors, CERTs, etc. are aware of the following:
  • Independent researchers and security consulting companies report vulnerabilities on a voluntary basis.
  • Independent researchers and security consulting companies have no obligation to report security vulnerabilities.
  • Independent researchers and security consulting companies often invest a lot of time, effort and resources finding vulnerabilities and trying to get them fixed.
  • Vendors and CERTs should be more appreciative of the people reporting vulnerabilities and, at the very least, be more responsive than they typically are today.
  • Vendors and CERTs should adhere and comply with their own defined deadlines.
I would like for vendors and CERTs to start improving a little and becoming more responsive; the attack surface grows everyday and vulnerabilities affect our lives more and more. The more we depend on technology the more the vulnerabilities will impact us.

There shouldn’t be vulnerability bureaucracy.

If there’s one thing that vendors and CERTs could do to improve the situation, that would be for them to step-up and be accountable for the vulnerability information entrusted to them.

 

I hope that in the following 12 years something will change for the better.