EDITORIAL | March 24, 2015

Lawsuit counterproductive for automotive industry

It came to my attention that there is a lawsuit attempting to seek damages against automakers revolving around their cars being hackable.

The lawsuit cites Dr. Charlie Miller’s and my work several times, along with several other researchers who have been involved in automotive security research.

I’d like to be the first to say that I think this lawsuit is unfortunate and subverts the spirit of our research. Charlie and I approached our work with the end goals of determining if technologically advanced cars could be controlled with CAN messages and informing the public of our findings. Obviously, we found this to be true and were surprised at how much could be manipulated with network messages. We learned so much about automobiles, their communications, and their associated physical actions.

Our intent was never to insinuate deliberate negligence on the part of the manufacturers. Instead, like most security researchers, we wanted to push the boundaries of what was thought to be possible and have fun doing it. While I do believe there is risk associated with vehicle connectivity, I think that a lawsuit can only be harmful as it has the potential to take funds away from what is really important:  securing the modern vehicle. I think any money automobile manufacturers must spend on legal fees would be more wisely spent on researching and developing automotive intrusion detection/prevention systems.

The automotive industry is not sitting idly by, but constantly working to improve the security of their past, present, and future vehicles. Security isn’t something that changes overnight, especially in the case of automobiles, which take even longer since there are both physical and software elements to be tested. Offensive security researchers will always be ahead of the people trying to formulate defenses, but that does not mean the defenders are not doing anything.

While our goals were public awareness and industry change, we did not want change to stem from the possible exploitation of public fears. Our hope was that by showing what is possible, we could work with the people who make the products we use and love on an everyday basis to improve vehicle security.

– cv

EDITORIAL | January 27, 2015

Life in the Fast Lane

Hi Internet Friends,
Chris Valasek here. You may remember me from educational films such as “Two Minus Three Equals Negative Fun”. If you have not heard, IOActive officially launched our Vehicle Security Service offering.
I’ve received several questions about the service and plan to answer them and many more during a webinar I am hosting on February 5, 2015 at 11 AM EST.
Some of the main talking points include: 
  • Why dedicate an entire service offering to vehicles and transportation?
  • A brief history of vehicle security research and why it has been relatively scarce
  • Why we believe that protecting vehicles and their supporting systems is of the utmost importance
  • IOActive’s goals for our Vehicle Security Service offering

Additionally, I’ll make sure to save sufficient time for Q&A to field your questions. I’d love to get as many questions as possible, so don’t be shy.

I look forward to your participation in the webinar on February 5,2015 11 AM EST. 

– cv
INSIGHTS | July 24, 2013

DefCon 21 Preview

Hi Internet!
You may have heard that Charlie Miller (@0xcharlie) and I (@nudehaberdasher) will present a car hacking presentation at DefCon 21 on Friday, August 2 at 10:00am.
“Adventures in Automotive Networks and Control Units” (Track 3)
(https://www.defcon.org/html/defcon-21/dc-21-schedule.html)
I wanted to put up a blog explaining what exactly we’ll be talking about in a bit more detail than was provided in the abstract. Our abstract was purposefully vague because we weren’t really sure what we were going to release at the time of submission, but obviously have a much more concrete set of items now.

Also we wanted to remind everyone that although we did not focus on remote attack vectors, intricate knowledge of a car’s internals / CAN network would be necessary after remotely compromising the vehicle for any amount of control (steering, braking, acceleration, etc).
Talking points
  1.  We will briefly discuss the ISO / Protocol standards that our two automobiles used to communicate on the CAN bus, also providing a Python and C API that can be used to replicate our work. The API is pretty generic so it can easily be modified to work with other makes / models.
  2.  The first type of CAN traffic we’ll discuss is diagnostic CAN messages. These types of message are usually used by mechanics to diagnose problems within the automotive network, sensors, and actuators. Although meant for maintenance, we’ll show how some of these messages can be used to physically control the automobile under certain conditions.
  3.  The second type of CAN data we’ll talk about is normal CAN traffic that the car regularly produces. These types of CAN messages are much more abundant but more difficult to reverse engineer and categorize (i.e. proprietary messages). Although time consuming, we’ll show how these messages, when played on the CAN network, have control over the most safety critical features of the automobile.
  4.  Finally we’ll talk about modifying the firmware and using the proprietary re-flashing processes used for each of our vehicles. Firmware modification is most likely necessary for any sort of persistence when attempting to permanently modify an automobile’s behavior. It will also show just how different this process is for each make/model, proving that ‘just ask the tuning community’ is not a viable option a majority of the time.
So there you have it. While we are NOT covering any remote attack vectors/exploits, we will be releasing documentation, code, tools, sample traffic from each vehicle, and more. At the very least you will be able to recreate our results, and with a little work should be able to start hacking your own car!
Make sure you come by DefCon Friday morning at 10am to see our talk. We promise that it will be worth getting up that early (or staying up through the night). Also, please keep checking back as we’ll post our paper, slides, code, and videos after DefCon.

P.S. If you’re lucky, you too can completely brick your car!