ELF Parsing Bugs by Example with Melkor Fuzzer
Too often the development community continues to blindly trust the metadata in Executable and Linking Format (ELF) files. In this paper, Alejandro Hernández walks you through the testing process for seven applications and reveals the bugs that he found. He performed the tests using Melkor, a file format fuzzer he wrote specifically for ELF files. Introduction The ELF file format, like any other file format, is an array of bits and bytes interconnected through data structures. When interpreted by an ELF parser, an ELF file makes sense, depending upon…
Facebook Access Token Sent in Plaintext
Attackers can steal Facebook access tokens to impersonate Facebook users and perform malicious actions that include, but are not limited to, posting content on behalf of users and accessing friend lists.
Bad Crypto 101
This post is part of a series about bad cryptography usage . We all rely heavily on cryptographic algorithms for data confidentiality and integrity, and although most commonly used algorithms are secure, they need to be used carefully and correctly. Just as holding a hammer backwards won’t yield the expected result, using cryptography badly won’t yield the expected results either. To refresh my Android skillset, I decided to take apart a few Android applications that offer to encrypt personal files and protect them from prying eyes. I headed off to…
OpenBSD ≤ 5.5 Local Kernel Panic
A non-privileged use could cause a local Denial-of-Service (DoS) condition by triggering a kernel panic through a malformed ELF executable.
Vicious POODLE Finally Kills SSL
The poodle must be the most vicious dog, because it has killed SSL. POODLE is the latest in a rather lengthy string of vulnerabilities in SSL (Secure Socket Layer) and a more recent protocol, TLS (Transport layer Security). Both protocols secure data that is being sent between applications to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, and message forgery. POODLE (Padding Oracle On Downgraded Legacy Encryption) rings the death knell for our 18-year-old friend SSL version 3.0 (SSLv3), because at this point, there is no truly safe way to continue using it. Google…
A Dirty Distillation of Proposed V2V Readiness
Good Afternoon Internet, Chris Valasek here. You may remember me from such automated information kiosks as “Welcome to Springfield Airport”, and “Where’s Nordstrom?” Ever since Dr. Charlie Miller and I began our car hacking adventures, we’ve been asked about the upcoming Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) initiative and haven’t had much to say because we only knew about the technology in the abstract. I finally decided to read the proposed documentation from the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) titled: “Vehicle-to-Vehicle Communications: Readiness of V2V Technology for Application” (https://ioactive.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Readiness-of-V2V-Technology-for-Application-812014.pdf). This is my…
Killing the Rootkit
Cross-platform, cross-architecture DKOM detection To know if your system is compromised, you need to find everything that could run or otherwise change state on your system and verify its integrity (that is, check that the state is what you expect it to be). “Finding everything” is a bold statement, particularly in the realm of computer security, rootkits, and advanced threats. Is it possible to find everything? Sadly, the short answer is no, it’s not. Strangely, the long answer is yes, it is. By defining the execution environment at any…
Silly Bugs That Can Compromise Your Social Media Life
A few months ago while I was playing with my smartphone, I decided to intercept traffic to see what it was sending. The first thing that caught my attention was the iOS Instagram app. For some reason, the app sent a request using a Facebook access token through an HTTP plain-text communication. Here is the original request that I intercepted from the Instagram app: POST /api/v1/fb/find/?include=extra_display_name HTTP/1.1 Host: instagram.com Proxy-Connection: keep-alive Accept: */* Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Content-Length: 337 Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=Boundary+0xAbCdEfGbOuNdArY Accept-Language: en;q=1, es-MX;q=0.9, fr;q=0.8, de;q=0.7, zh-Hans;q=0.6,…
Remote survey paper (car hacking)
Good Afternoon Interwebs, Chris Valasek here. You may remember me from such nature films as “Earwigs: Eww”. Charlie and I are finally getting around to publicly releasing our remote survey paper. I thought this went without saying but, to reiterate, we did NOT physically look at the cars that we discussed. The survey was designed as a high level overview of the information that we acquired from the mechanic’s sites for each manufacturer. The ‘Hackability’ is based upon our previous experience with automobiles, attack surface, and network structure. Enjoy!
Upcoming Blackhat & DEF CON talk: A Survey of Remote Automotive Attack Surfaces
Hi Internet, Chris Valasek here; you may remember me from such movies as ‘They Came to Burgle Carnegie Hall’. In case you haven’t heard, Dr. Charlie Miller and I will be giving a presentation at Black Hat and DEF CON titled ‘A Survey of Remote Automotive Attack Surfaces’. You may have seen some press coverage on Wired, CNN, and Dark Reading several days ago. I really think they all did a fantastic job covering what we’ll be talking about.