Tag: processor hack

INSIGHTS | November 3, 2007

Safenet iKey 1000 In-depth Look Inside

By IOActive
We received a lot of  attention from our previous article regarding the  iKey 2032. We  present to you a teardown of a lesser, weaker Safenet, Inc. iKey 1000 series USB token.

We had two purple iKey 1000 tokens on hand that we took apart-Cypress 24 pin CY7C63001/101 type USB controller is a likely candidate underneath the epoxy above

 

Cypress’ USB controllers run from a 6 Mhz oscillator and an 8 pin SOIC EEPROM might be beneath this smaller epoxy area

 

Once we took our initial images of the two sides, it was time to remove whatever was under the epoxy.

 

If needed, we can clean off the remaining epoxy

 

There was indeed a serial EEPROM underneath the bottom side.  Removing took some heat and we lost the cover to our oscillator during the process.

 

Opening the device revealed exactly what we suspected (we could sort-of tell by the 24 pin SOIC) being familiar with the Cypress family of processors. We discovered a Cypress CY7C63101.

 

The red pin denotes pin 1 of this Cypress CY7C63101

 

A 200x magnification photo of the die above shows a 20 pin version of the CPU used in the iKey1000 token.

 

The Cypress CY7C63 family of USB microcontrollers have serious security issues.  This family of  processors should not be used by anyone expecting their security token to be secure. Unfortunately, we’ve seen a lot of dongles using this family of CPU’s.

 

We successfully read out the CPU (using our magic wand again). Poking around the code looking for  ASCII text we found the USB identifier string at address offset $0B7: “i.-.K.e.y”

 

The code contained inside the Cypress CPU is always static between iKey1000 tokens.  The Cypress CPU is a One-Time Programmable (OTP) type device.  There is no non-volatile type memory inside except for the EPROM you may program once (hence OTP).  The only changes possible are within the external EEPROM which is a dynamic element to the token.  The EEPROM turned out to be a commonly found 24LC64 8K byte EEPROM.

 

Given the above, we can then assume that the iKey1032 is identical to this token with the except of replacing the 24LC64 with a larger 24LC256 32K byte EEPROM.  This is a logical assumption supported by Safenet’s brochure on the token.
Are you securing your laptop with this token?  We are not…
INSIGHTS |

In retrospect – A quick peek at the Intel 80286

By IOActive

We thought we would mix the blog up a little and take you back in time.  To a time when the fastest PC’s ran at a mere 12 Mhz.  The time was 1982.  Some of us were busy trying to beat Zork or one of the Ultima series role-playing games.  You were lucky to have a color monitor on your PC back then.

We happen to have a 1982 era Siemens 80286

If anyone is interested in donating any old devices such as an i4004 or i8008, please email us.
INSIGHTS | October 30, 2007

Safenet iKey 2032 In-depth Look Inside

By IOActive

Chances are you have probably seen one of these little USB based tokens made from  Safenet, Inc.

The one we opened was in a blue shell.

 

Safekey says, iKey 2032 is a compact, two-factor authentication token that provides client security for network authentication, e-mail encryption, and digital signing applications.”

As well, the brochure the link above takes you too states,  iKey 2032s small size and rugged, tamper resistant construction, make it easy to carry so users can always have their unique digital entities with them.”

Now we’re not really sure what tamper resistant construction has to do with making things easy for a user to carry around  but let’s get down to the good stuff.

 

We carefully decapsulated the epoxy covering the die buried inside the 24 pin SOIC part.  What did we find?  We found a Cypress CY7C63613!  We suspected it might be this part because of the pinout.   This is why scratching off the top of the part does not always help.  Even with the silkscreen scratched away, there are only a few possible candidates using this pinout.   Additionally, this CPU is very common used in  USB  applications.

 

Once the CPU was decapsulated, we performed some tests on the device.   After executing some tricks, the software contained internally was magically in our hands.

 

We looked for some type of copyright information in the software but all we found was the USB identifier string at address offset $3C0: i.K.e.y. .2.0.3.2

 

Now that we successfully analyzed the CPU, the protocol for communications to whatever is present under the epoxy is available to us.   At this point, we believe it’s more than a serial EEPROM because this CPU is not strong enough to calculate  asymmetric cryptographic algorithms in a timely manner.

 

Next we carefully removed the die-bonded substrate from the PCB:

 

With the die-bonded device removed and a little cleanup, we can clearly see the bondout pattern for a die-bonded smartcard IC. We can see VCC, RST, CLK, IO, and GND layed out according to the ISO-7816 standard which Flylogic Engineering are experts on.

 

After completely decapsulating the smartcard processor, we found a quite common Philips smartcard IC.   We will call this part from now on the Crypto-Coprocessor (CCP).

 

The CCP fits into place on the PCB.   It is glued down and then five aluminum wires were wedge-bonded to the PCB.   Aluminum wedge-bonding was used so the PCB would not need to be heated which would help them cut down the time required on the assembly line.

 

In preparation for analysis, we had to rebond the  CCP into a 24-pin ceramic dip (CDIP). Although we only needed five contacts rebonded, the die-size was too large to fit into the cavity of an 8-pin CDIP.

 

The CCP is fabricated by Philips.  It appears to be a  ~250nm, five metal layer technology based on the Intel 8051 platform.  It contains 32k of EEPROM, two static ram areas and a ROM nested underneath a mesh made up of someone(s) initials (probably the layout designers).

 

This CPU (The CCP is also a CPU but acting as a slave to the Cypress CPU)  is not secure.   In fact, this CPU is also all over the globe in GSM SIM cards. The only difference is the code contained inside the processor.

 

Some points of interest:

 

Point #1-  The ‘mesh’ protecting probing from the ROM’s databus outputs is NOT SECURE!
Point #2- A quick search on the internet and we came across a public document from when Philips tried to get this part or a part very close to this one common criteria certified. The document labels this assumed to-be part as a, “Philips P8WE5033V0F Secure 8-bit Smart Card Controller.“

 

Reading over this document, we find a block diagram on page 8.

 

“Security Sensors” as a block of logic.  That’s ironic considering we opened a gaping hole in their “mesh” over the ROM and the processor still runs 100% functional.

 

Point #3-  For such a “secure” device, Philips could have done a lot more.  The designer’s were pretty careless in a lot of areas.  Simply reconnecting the two tracks together will definately be helpful to an attacker.   A Focused Ion-Beam Workstation can make bond-pads for those two tracks that we can then bond out to the CDIP.  This way  we can short or open this test-circuit.

 

Now ask yourself if you are a potential customer to Safenet, Inc   Would you purchase this token?