NFC RELAY ATTACK ON TESLA MODEL Y
Josep Pi Rodriguez, Principal Security Consultant, walks you through the proof-of-concept and technical details of exploitation for IOActive’s recent NFC relay attack research on the newest Tesla vehicle, the Model Y. To successfully carry out the attack, IOActive reverse-engineered the NFC protocol Tesla uses between the NFC card and the vehicle, and we then created custom firmware modifications that allowed a Proxmark RDV4.0 device to relay NFC communications over Bluetooth/Wi -Fi using the Proxmark’s BlueShark module. It’s well-known in the vehicle security industry that NFC relay attacks (as well as…
Vulnerability and Patch Management: Every Day is a Zero Day
SC Media on-demand presentation | John Sheehy, SVP of Research and Strategy, participated as a panelist on the CyberRisk Alliance’s eSummit live broadcast.Patch management can be an especially precarious proposition when you’re operating in a work environment where machines and devices must constantly remain operational. Hospitals, factories and power plants are among the many examples of settings where security professionals need to “keep the lights on,” even as they strive to ensure that software and hardware are hardened against the latest vulnerabilities and exploits. The discussion focused on the…
The Battle of Good versus Evil: Regulations and Cybersecurity | Urban Jonson
We all recognize the importance of the DRS Organization Policy within a GCP Org, now we’d like to discuss Cross-Domain Sharing, or XDS as we are calling it. Do you know where your organization’s identities are being used externally? If not, we want to share details on the risks and how SADA can help assess your GCP org.
Update on SATCOM Terminal Attacks During the War in Ukraine
In a prior post titled “Missed Calls for SATCOM Cybersecurity: SATCOM Terminal Cyberattacks Open the War in Ukraine,” I shared three hypotheses about the identity of the threat actor responsible for the SATCOM terminal attacks that opened the war.1 On 31 March 2022, shortly after my post went live, other posts examining forensic evidence from the attack provided some of the additional information needed to support or reject these hypotheses. Open-Source Forensic Analysis Ruben Santamarta published a blog post titled “VIASAT Incident: From Speculation to Technical Details”…
Reverse Engineering of DAL-A Certified Avionics: Collins’ Pro Line Fusion—AFD-3700
Ruben Santamarta, IOActive Security Researcher, presents a highly technical and detailed look into reverse engineering the DAL-A Certified Avionics: Collins’ Pro Line Fusion—AFD-3700. Modern avionic systems are designed according to the Integrated Modular Avionics concept. Under this paradigm, safety-certified avionic applications and non-critical airborne software share the same computing platform but are running at different partitions. In this context the underlying safety-critical certified RTOS provides the logical isolation, which should prevent unintended interactions between software with different criticalities. This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of the architecture and vulnerabilities found…
Satellite (In)security: Vulnerability Analysis of Wideye SATCOM Terminals
Introduction This blog post introduces our most recent whitepaper detailing original research into two SATCOM terminals manufactured by Addvalue Technologies, Ltd.: the Wideye iSavi and Wideye SABRE Ranger 5000. We identified numerous serious security vulnerabilities in both devices, including broken or backdoored authentication mechanisms, rudimentary data parsing errors allowing for complete device compromise over the network, completely inadequate firmware security, and sensitive information disclosure, including the leaking of terminal GPS coordinates. These issues were present in all reviewed firmware versions, including the currently available release. Research Goals The…
Cyberattacks on SATCOM: Understanding the Threat
In 2014, Ruben Santamarta, Principal Security Consultant with IOActive, published a whitepaper titled “A Wake-up Call for SATCOM Security.” It detailed the discovery of an exceptionally weak security posture across a number of SATCOM terminals from a range of manufacturers. Four years later in 2018, Ruben published a follow up titled “Last Call for SATCOM Security” which detailed a thorough investigation into the security of SATCOM equipment across the Aviation, Maritime, and Military industries. In light of the cyberattacks at the start of the war…
Missed Calls for SATCOM Cybersecurity: SATCOM Terminal Cyberattacks Open the War in Ukraine
Unfortunately, IOActive was right. IOActive presciently foresaw the use of cyberattacks against commercial satellite communication (SATCOM) terminals and has worked tirelessly to warn the industry for the last nine years. There have been several credible reports of destructive exploitation of vulnerabilities in commercial SATCOM terminals during the opening hours of the War in Ukraine by Russian elements to prepare the battlefield.1,2,3 I’m disappointed that more industry members didn’t heed our warning, which provided ample time to act and mitigate the realization of these threats….
Batteries Not Included: Reverse Engineering Obscure Architectures
Introduction I recently encountered a device whose software I wanted to reverse engineer. After initial investigation, the device was determined to be using a processor based on Analog Devices’ Blackfin architecture. I had never heard of or worked with this architecture, nor with the executable format used by the system, and little to no support for it was present in existing reverse engineering tooling. This article will cover the two-week journey I took going from zero knowledge to full decompilation and advanced analysis, using Binary Ninja. The code discussed in…
Responding to a Changing Threatscape: Sharing More
IOActive’s mission is to make the world a safer and more secure place. In the past, we’ve worked to innovate in the responsible disclosure process.