Specifications for XML and XML schemas include multiple security flaws. At the same time, these specifications provide the tools required to protect XML applications. This provides a complex scenario for developers, and a fun environment for hackers. Even though we use XML schemas to define the security of XML documents, we also use them to perform a variety of attacks: file retrieval, server side request forgery, port scanning, or brute forcing. This talk will analyze how to infer new attack vectors by analyzing the current vulnerabilities, and how it is…
Since 2010, several automotive security researchers have demonstrated the ability to inject messages into the CAN bus of a car, capable of affecting the physical systems of the vehicle. The widespread criticism of these methods as viable attack vectors was the claim that there was not a way for an attacker to inject these types of messages without close physical access to the vehicle. In this paper, Chris Valasek and Charlie Miller demonstrate that remote attacks against unaltered vehicles is possible.
Cities around the world are becoming increasingly smart, which creates huge attack surfaces for potential cyber attacks. In this paper, IOActive Labs CTO Cesar Cerrudo provides an overview of current cyber security problems affecting cities as well real threats and possible cyber attacks that could have a huge impact on cities. Cities must take defensive steps now, and Cesar offers recommendations to help them get started.
Too often the development community continues to blindly trust the metadata in Executable and Linking Format (ELF) files. In this paper, Alejandro Hernández walks you through the testing process for seven applications and reveals the bugs that he found. He performed the tests using Melkor, a file format fuzzer he wrote specifically for ELF files.
By looking at each car’s remote attack surface, internal network architecture, and computer controlled features, we are able to draw some conclusions about the suitability of the vehicle to remote attack. This doesn’t mean that the most susceptible looking isn’t in fact quite secure (i.e. coded very securely) or that the most secure looking isn’t in fact trivially exploitable, but it does provide some objective measure of the security of a large number of vehicles that wouldn’t be possible to examine in detail without a massive effort. It also provides…
Satellite Communications (SATCOM) play a vital role in the global telecommunications system. IOActive evaluated the security posture of the most widely deployed Inmarsat and Iridium SATCOM terminals. IOActive found that malicious actors could abuse all of the devices within the scope of this study.
This research focuses on reducing the barrier to entry for automotive security assessments. The goal is to increase the number of security researchers working in this area by providing step-by-step information on how to evaluate, test, and assess Electronic Control Units (ECUs) without requiring a vehicle. To accomplish the work described in this paper, you only need inexpensive electronics and an ECU. Most, if not all, of the equipment and vehicle parts can be acquired from third-party sources, such as eBay or Amazon.
Previous research has shown that an attacker can execute remote code on the electronic control units (ECU) in automotive vehicles via interfaces such as Bluetooth and the telematics unit: http://www.autosec.org/pubs/cars-usenixsec2011.pdf. This paper expands on the topic and describes how an attacker can influence a vehicle’s behavior. It includes examples of mission critical controls, such as steering, braking, and acceleration, being manipulated using Controller Area Network (CAN) messages.
Adobe products have long touted how they enable organizations to collaborate and share information in heterogeneous environments. However, a recent stream of vulnerabilities identified in Adobe products has caused a great deal of concern about the overall security threat associated with using these products. IOActive security experts offer suggestions for how to best protect your computer.
This paper reviews the most commonly implemented key distribution schemes, their weaknesses, and how vendors can more effectively align their designs with key distribution solutions. We also demonstrate some attacks that exploit key distribution vulnerabilities, which we recently discovered in every wireless device developed over the past few years by three leading industrial wireless automation solution providers. These devices are widely used by many energy, oil, water, nuclear, natural gas, and refined petroleum companies.