COLLATERAL | August 28, 2023

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Our silicon security team helps risk managers, product owners, designers, and cybersecurity professionals understand and manage the emerging risks of silicon-level and hardware-based supply chain attacks.

IOActive has spent over two decades at the forefront of cybersecurity research and providing critical security services fueled by the research. As the security of systems (and systems of systems) increasingly depends upon proper hardware security design and implementation, we have invested in honing silicon-level attack techniques that complement the advanced expertise we have long developed in identifying the embedded-device, side-channel, and fault-injection attacks.

Our silicon security services adds black-box and gray-box attacks to our commercial white-box work – which includes development of threat models at the microprocessor and SOC level – supporting clients in defining security design requirements, and performing register transfer level (RTL) and GDS partial layout reviews.

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INSIGHTS | March 22, 2016

Inside the IOActive Silicon Lab: Interpreting Images

By Andrew Zonenberg

In the post “Reading CMOS layout,” we discussed understanding CMOS layout in order to reverse-engineer photographs of a circuit to a transistor-level schematic. This was all well and good, but I glossed over an important (and often overlooked) part of the process: using the photos to observe and understand the circuit’s actual geometry.

Optical Microscopy

Let’s start with brightfield optical microscope imagery. (Darkfield microscopy is rarely used for semiconductor work.) Although reading lower metal layers on modern deep-submicron processes does usually require electron microscopy, optical microscopes still have their place in the reverse engineer’s toolbox. They are much easier to set up and run quickly, have a wider field of view at low magnifications, need less sophisticated sample preparation, and provide real-time full-color imagery. An optical microscope can also see through glass insulators, allowing inspection of some underlying structures without needing to deprocess the device.

This can be both a blessing and a curse. If you can see underlying structures in upper-layer images, it can be much easier to align views of different layers. But it can also be much harder to tell what you’re actually looking at! Luckily, another effect comes to the rescue – depth of field.

Depth of field

When using an objective with 40x power or higher, a typical optical microscope has a useful focal plane of less than 1 µm. This means that it is critical to keep the sample stage extremely flat – a slope of only 100 nm per mm (0.005 degrees) can result in one side of a 10x10mm die being in razor-sharp focus while the other side is blurred beyond recognition.

In the image below (from a Micrel KSZ9021RN gigabit Ethernet PHY) the top layer is in sharp focus but all of the features below are blurred—the deeper the layer, the less easy it is to see.

We as reverse engineers can use this to our advantage. By sweeping the focus up or down, we can get a qualitative feel for which wires are above, below, or on the same layer as other wires. Although it can be useful in still photos, the effect is most intuitively understood when looking through the eyepiece and adjusting the focus knob by hand. Compare the previous image to this one, with the focal plane shifted to one of the lower metal layers.

I also find that it’s sometimes beneficial to image a multi-layer IC using a higher magnification than strictly necessary, in order to deliberately limit the depth of field and blur out other wiring layers. This can provide a cleaner, more easily understood image, even if the additional resolution isn’t necessary.

Color

Another important piece of information the optical microscope provides is color. The color of a feature under an optical microscope is typically dependent on three factors:

Material color
Orientation of the surface relative to incident light
Thickness of the glass/transparent material over it

Material color is the easiest to understand. A flat, smooth surface of a substance with nothing on top will have the same color as the bulk material. The octagonal bond pads in the image below (a Xilinx XC3S50A FPGA), for example, are made of bare aluminum and show up as a smooth silvery color, just as one would expect. Unfortunately, most materials used in integrated circuits are either silvery (silicon, polysilicon, aluminum, tungsten) or clear (silicon dioxide or nitride). Copper is the lone exception.

Orientation is another factor to consider. If a feature is tilted relative to the incident light, it will be less brightly lit. The dark squares in the image below are vias in the upper metal layer which go down to the next layer; the “sag” in the top layer is not filled in this process so the resulting slopes show up as darker. This makes topography visible on an otherwise featureless surface.

The third property affecting observed color of a feature is the glass thickness above it. When light hits a reflective surface under a transparent, reflective surface, some of the beam bounces off the lower surface and some bounces off the top of the glass. The two beams interfere with each other, producing constructive and destructive interference at wavelengths equal to multiples of the glass thickness.

This is the same effect responsible for the colors seen in a film of oil floating on a puddle of water–the reflections from the oil’s surface and the oil-water interface interfere. Since the oil film is not exactly the same thickness across the entire puddle, the observed colors vary slightly. In the image above, the clear silicon nitride passivation is uniform in thickness, so the top layer wiring (aluminum, mostly for power distribution) shows up as a uniform tannish color. The next layer down has more glass over it and shows up as a slightly different pink color.

Compare that to the image below (an Altera EPM3064A CPLD). The thickness of the top passivation layer varies significantly across the die surface, resulting in rainbow-colored fringes.

Electron Microscopy

The scanning electron microscope is the preferred tool for imaging finer pitch features (below about 250 nm). Due to the smaller wavelength of electron beams as compared to visible light, this tool can obtain significantly higher resolutions.

The basic operating principle of a SEM is similar to an old-fashioned CRT display: electromagnets move a beam of electrons in a vacuum chamber in a raster-scan pattern over the sample. At each pixel, the beam interacts with the sample, producing several forms of radiation that the microscope can detect and use for imaging.

Electron microscopy in general has an extremely high depth of field, making it very useful for imaging 3D structures. The image below (copper bond wires on a Microchip PIC12F683) has about the same field of view as the optical images from the beginning of this article, but even from a tilted perspective the entire loop of wire is in sharp focus.

Secondary Electron Images

The most common general-purpose image detector for the SEM is the secondary electron detector. When a high-energy electron from the scanning beam grazes an atom in the sample, it sometimes dislodges an electron from the outer shell. Secondary electrons have very low energy, and will slow to a stop after traveling a fairly short distance. As a result, only those generated very near the surface of the sample will escape and be detected.

This makes secondary electron images very sensitive to topography. Outside edges, tilted surfaces, and small point features (dust and particulates) show up brighter than a flat surface because a high percentage of the secondary electrons are generated near exposed surfaces of the specimen. Inward-facing edges show up dimmer than a flat surface because a high percentage of the secondary electrons are absorbed in the material.

The general appearance of a secondary electron image is similar to a surface lit up with a floodlight. The eye position is that of the objective lens, and the “light source” appears to come from the position of the secondary electron detector.

In the image below (the polysilicon layer of a Microchip PIC12F683 before cleaning), the polysilicon word lines running horizontally across the memory array have bright edges, which shows that they are raised above the background. The diamond-shaped source/drain areas have dark “shadowed” edges, showing that they are lower than their surroundings (and thus many of the secondary electrons are being absorbed). The dust particles and loose tungsten via plugs scattered around the image show up very brightly because they have so much exposed surface area.

Compare the above SEM view to the optical image of the same area below. Note that the SEM image has much higher resolution, but the optical image reveals (through color changes) thickness variations in the glass layer that are not obvious in the SEM. This can be very helpful when trying to gauge progress or uniformity of an etch/polish operation.

In addition to the primary contrast mechanism discussed above, the efficiency of secondary electron emission is weakly dependent on the elemental composition of the material being observed. For example, at 20 kV the number of secondary electrons produced for a given beam current is about four times higher for tungsten than for silicon (see this paper). While this may lead to some visible contrast in a secondary electron image, if elemental information is desired, it would be preferable to use a less topography-sensitive imaging mode.

Backscattered Electron Images

Secondary electron imaging does not work well on flat specimens, such as a die that has been polished to remove upper metal layers or a cross section. Although it’s often possible to etch such a sample to produce topography for imaging in secondary electron mode, it’s usually easier to image the flat sample using backscatter mode.

When a high-energy beam electron directly impacts the nucleus of an atom in the sample, it will bounce back at high speed in the approximate direction it came from. The probability of such a “backscatter” event happening depends on the atomic number Z of the material being imaged. Since backscatters are very energetic, the surrounding material does not easily absorb them. As a result, the appearance of the resulting image is not significantly influenced by topography and contrast is primarily dependent on material (Z-contrast).

In the image below (cross section of a Xilinx XC2C32A CPLD), the silicon substrate (bottom, Z=14) shows up as a medium gray. The silicon dioxide insulator between the wires is darker due to the lower average atomic number (Z=8 for oxygen). The aluminum wires (Z=13) are about the same color as the silicon, but the titanium barrier layer (Z=22) above and below is significantly brighter. The tungsten vias (Z=74) are extremely bright white. Looking at the bottom right where the via plugs touch the silicon, a thin layer of cobalt (Z=27) silicide is visible.

Depending on the device you are analyzing, any or all of these three imaging techniques may be useful. Knowledge of the pros and cons of these techniques and the ability to interpret their results are key skills for the semiconductor reverse engineer.

RESEARCH | February 24, 2016

Inside the IOActive Silicon Lab: Reading CMOS layout

By Andrew Zonenberg

Ever wondered what happens inside the IOActive silicon lab? For the next few weeks we’ll be posting a series of blogs that highlight some of the equipment, tools, attacks, and all around interesting stuff that we do there. We’ll start off with Andrew Zonenberg explaining the basics of CMOS layout.

Basics of CMOS Layout

When describing layout, this series will use a simplified variant of Mead & Conway’s color scheme, which hides some of the complexity required for manufacturing.

Material	Color
P doping
N doping
Polysilicon
Via
Metal 1
Metal 2
Metal 3
Metal 4

The basic building block of a modern integrated circuit (IC) is the metal-oxide-semiconductor field effect transistor, or MOSFET. As the name implies, it is a field-effecttransistor (an electronic switch which is turned on or off by an electric field, rather than by current flow) made out of a metal-oxide-semiconductor “sandwich”.

(Terminology note: In modern processes, the gate is often made of polycrystalline silicon, aka polysilicon, rather than a metal. As is the tradition in the IC fab literature, we typically use the term “poly” to refer to the gate material, regardless of whether it is actually metal or poly.)

Without further ado, here’s a schematic cross-section and top view of an N-channelMOSFET. The left and right terminals are the source and drain and the center is the gate.

Figure 1: N-channel MOFSET

Cross-section view

Top view

Signals enter and exit through the metal wires on the top layer (blue, seen head-on in this view), and are connected to the actual transistor by vertical connections, or vias (black). The actual transistor consists of portions of a silicon wafer which have been “doped” with various materials to have either a surplus (N-type, green) or lack (P-type, yellow) of free electrons in the outer shell. Both the source and drain have the same type of doping and the channel between them has the opposite type. The gate terminal, made of poly (red) is placed in close proximity to the channel, separated by a thin layer of an insulator, usually silicon dioxide (usually abbreviated simply as “oxide,” not shown in this drawing).

When the gate is held at a low voltage relative to the bulk silicon (typically circuit ground), the free electrons near the channel in the source and drain migrate to the channel and fill in the empty spots in the outer electron shells, forming a highly non-conductive “depletion region.” This results in the source and drain becoming electrically isolated from each other. The transistor is off.

When the gate is raised to a high voltage (typically 0.8 to 3.3 volts for modern ICs), the positive field pulls additional electrons up into the channel, resulting in an excess of charge carriers and a conductive channel. The transistor is on.

Meanwhile, the P-channel MOSFET, shown below, has almost the same structure but with everything mirrored. The source and drain are P-doped, the channel is N-doped, and the transistor turns on when the gate is at a negativevoltage relative to the bulk silicon (typically the positive power rail).

Figure 2: P-channel MOFSET

Cross-section view

Top view

Several schematic symbols are commonly used for MOSFETs. We’ll use the CMOS-style symbols (with an inverter bubble on the gate to denote a P-channel device and no distinction between source and drain). This reflects the common use of these transistors for digital logic: an NMOS (at left below) turns on when the gate is high and a PMOS (at right below) when the gate is low. Although there are often subtle differences between source and drain in the manufacturing process, we as reverse engineers don’t care about the details of the physics or manufacturing. We just want to know what the circuit does.

Figure 3: Schematic symbols

NMOS PMOS

So, in order to reverse engineer a CMOS layout to schematic, all we need is a couple of photographs showing the connections between transistors… right? Not so fast. We must be able to tell PMOS from NMOS without the benefit of color coding.

As seen in the actual electron microscope photo below (a single 2-input gate from a Xilinx XC2C32A, 180nm technology), there’s no obvious difference in appearance.

Figure 4: Electron microscope view of a single 2-input gate

We can see four transistors (two at the top and two at the bottom) driven by two inputs (the vertical poly gates). The source and drain vias are clearly visible as bright white dots; the connections to the gates were removed by etching off the upper levels of the chip but we can still see the rounded “humps” on the poly where they were located. The lack of a via at the bottom center suggests that the lower two transistors are connected in series, while the upper ones are most likely connected in parallel since the middle terminal is broken out.

There are a couple of ways we can figure out which is which. Since N-channel devices typically connect the source to circuit ground and P-channel usually connect the source to power, we can follow the wiring out to the power/ground pins and figure things out that way. But what if you’re thrown into the middle of a massive device and don’t want to go all the way to the pins? Physics to the rescue!

As it turns out, P-channel devices are less efficient than N-channel – in other words, given two otherwise identical transistors made on the same process, the P-channel device will only conduct current about 30-50% as well as the N-channel device. This is a problem for circuit designers since it means that pulling an output signal high takes 2-3 times as long as pulling it low! In order to compensate for this effect, they will usually make the P-channel device about twice as wide, effectively connecting two identical transistors in parallel to provide double the drive current.

This leads to a natural rule of thumb for the reverse engineer. Except in unusual cases (some I/O buffers, specialized analog circuitry, etc.) it is typically desirable to have equal pull-up and pull-down force on a signal. As a result, we can conclude with fairly high certainty that if some transistors in a given gate are double the width of others, the wider ones are P-channel and the narrower are N-channel. In the case of the gate shown above, this would mean that at the top we have two N-channel transistors in parallel and at the bottom two P-channel in series.

Since this gate was taken from the middle of a standard-cell CMOS logic array and looks like a simple 2-input function, it’s reasonable to guess that the sources are tied to power and drains are tied to the circuit output. Assuming this is the case, we can sketch the following circuit.

Figure 5: CMOS 2-input circuit

This is a textbook example of a CMOS 2-input NOR gate. When either A or B is high, either Q2 or Q4 will turn on, pulling C low. When both A and B are low, both Q1 and Q3 will turn on, pulling C high.

Stay tuned for the next post in this series!

INSIGHTS | April 3, 2008

Atmel AT91SAM7S Overview

By IOActive

Atmel produces a number of ARM based devices in their portfolio of products. We had one laying around the lab so here we go as usual…

The device was a 48 pin QFP type package. We also purchased a sample of the other members of the family although the initial analysis was done on the AT91SAM7S32 part shown above. All pictures will relate to this specific part even though there is not a signifigant difference between the other members of this line except memory sizes.

After decapsulating the die from inside the QFP, we find a beautifully layed out 210nm 5 metal design! Thats right, 5 metal layers! Strangely enough, we would have thought this was a 220nm 5 metal but apparently Atmel doesn’t have a .22um process so this is matching their .21um.

The core runs at 1.8v and allows 1.65v operation (thus it is their ATC20 process being used). The datasheet on the device can be found here. The 32KB Flash part also contains 8KB of SRAM (that’s a lot of ram!).

Notice on this particular layout, there is CMP filler metal (e.g. dead metal, metal slugs that are not connected to anything floating in SIO2) covering almost the entire die.

The picture above actually has had the top 2 metal layers removed. Metal 5 (M5) being the highest with the CMP filler and some power planes. Metal 4 (M4) had additional power planes and routing wires.

With Metals 1-3 still present, we can get a nice overview of the floorplan now. We can see the Flash, Fuses, and SRAM clearly. The Flash has a solid coating of metal over the entire cell area which has become common from Atmel to prevent UV light attacks we suppose?

We can now label the areas on the original top metal overview photo. There is a small boot-rom loader present on the device as well and is explained in the manual.

These cells were actually on Metal 1 and 2 but there are connections via Metal 3 as well.

There were additional power planes across the lower area of the photo from Metal 4 and 5 that cover those fuses however this isn’t buying them any security if the actual lock bits were buried there. A laser can go right through it all keeping the power-bus in tact with a hole in it.

In summary, this is a very well secured device. Fuses buried in a 5 metal layer design make the Microchip DSPIC’s look like a piece of cake in comparision (They are 350nm 4 metal).

We didn’t test this, but we are sure UV will set this fuses to a bad state if you can get the light to the floating gate since most all Atmel’s behave this way.

Nice job Atmel!

INSIGHTS | February 13, 2008

Atmel CryptoMemory AT88SC153/1608 :: Security Alert

By IOActive

A “backdoor” has been discovered by Flylogic Engineering in the Atmel AT88SC153 and AT88SC1608 CryptoMemory.

Before we get into this more, we want to let you know immediately that this backdoor only involves the AT88SC153/1608 and no other CryptoMemory devices.

The backdoor involves restoring an EEPROM fuse with Ultra-Violet light (UV). Once the fuse bit has been returned to a ‘1’, all memory contents is permitted to be read or written in the clear (unencrypted).

Normally in order to do so, you need to either authenticate to the device or use a read-once-given “secure code” as explained in the AT88SC153 datasheet and the AT88SC1608 datasheet.

For those of you who are unfamiliar Atmel’s CryptoMemory, they are serial non-volatile memory (EEPROM) that support a clear or secure channel of communications between a host (typically an MCU) and the memory. What is unique about the CryptoMemory are their capabilities in establishing the secure channel (authenticating to the host, etc).

These device includes:

High-security Memory Including Anti-wiretapping

64-bit Authentication Protocol

Secure Checksum

Configurable Authentication Attempts Counter

These device includes:

Multiple Sets of Passwords
Specific Passwords for Read and Write
Password Attempts Counters
Selectable Access Rights by Zone
High-security Memory Including Anti-wiretapping
64-bit Authentication Protocol
Secure Checksum
Configurable Authentication Attempts Counter

Section 5 of the datasheet labled, “Fuses” clearly states, “Once blown, these EEPROM fuses can not be reset.”

This statement is absolutely false. UV light will erase the fuses back to a ‘1’ state. Care must be used to not expose the main memory to the UV or else it too will erase itself.

We are not going to explain the details of how to use the UV light to reset the fuse. We have tried to contact Atmel but have not heard anything back from them.

Reading deeper into the datasheet under Table 5-1, Atmel writes, “When the fuses are all “1”s, read and write are allowed in the entire memory.”

As strange as it reads, they really do mean even if you have setup security rules in the configuration memory, it doesn’t matter. The fuses override everything and all memory areas are readable in the clear without the need for authentication or encrypted channel! The attacker can even see what the “Secure Code” is (it is not given out in the public documentation, nor with samples). Atmel was even kind enough to leave test pads everywhere so various levels of attackers can learn (entry to expert).

Our proof of concept was tested on samples we acquired through Atmel’s website. Atmel offers samples to anyone however they do not give out the “Secure code” as mentioned above.

The secure code of the AT88SC153 samples was “$D_ $F_ $7_”.
The secure code of the AT88SC1608 was “$7_ $5_ $5_”.

We are not going to show you the low nibble of the 3 bytes to make sure we don’t give the code out to anyone. This is enough proof to whoever else knows this code. That person(s) can clearly see we know their transport code which appears to be common to all samples (e.g. All die on a wafer contain the same secure code until a customer orders parts at which time that customer receives their own secure code.). A person reading this cannot guess the secure code in because there are 12 bits to exhaustively search out and you only have 8 tries ;).

Of all the other CryptoMemory products, only the AT88SC153/1608 has this backdoor. We have successfully analyzed the entire CryptoMemory product line and can say that the backdoor doesn’t exist in any other CryptoMemory part. None of the CryptoMemory parts are actually as “secure” as they make it seem. The words, “Smoke n’ Mirrors” comes to mind (It is almost always like that). In this particular category of CryptoMemory, there are two parts, the AT88SC153 and the larger AT88SC1608.

Thus the questions-

- Why has Atmel only backdoored this part (NSA for you conspiracists)?

- Who was the original intended customer supposed to be?

- Was the original intention of these devices to be used in a product that used some kind of cryptography?

If the above was true, was this device originally intended to be a cryptographic key-vault?

All these questions come to mind because the backdoor makes it so easy to extract the contents of the device they want you to trust. Some of you may be familiar with the GSM A5/1 algorithm having certain bits of the key set to a fixed value.

Judging by the wording of the documentation, Atmel gives the appearance that CryptoMemory are the perfect choice for holding your most valuable secrets.

Give us your thoughts…

INSIGHTS | January 24, 2008

ATMEGA88 Teardown

By IOActive

An 8k FLASH, 512 bytes EEPROM, 512 bytes SRAM CPU operating 1:1 with the external world unlike those Microchip PIC’s we love to write up about :).

It’s a 350 nanometer (nm), 3 metal layer device fabricated in a CMOS process. It’s beautiful to say the least; We’ve torn it down and thought we’d blog about it!

The process Atmel uses on their .35 micrometer (um) technology is awesome.

Using a little HydroFluoric Acid (HF) and we partially removed the top metal layer (M3). Everything is now clearly visible for our analysis. After delaying earlier above, we can now recognize features that were otherwise hidden such as the Static RAM (SRAM) and the 32 working registers.

As we mentioned earlier, we used the word, “awesome” because check this out- It’s so beautifully layed out that we can etch off just enough of the top metal layer to leave it’s residue so it’s still visible depending on the focal point of the microscope! This is very important.

We removed obscuring metal but can still see where it went (woot!).The two photos above contain two of the 30+ configuration fuses present however it makes a person wonder why did Atmel cover the floating gate of the upper fuse with a plate of metal (remember the microchip article with the plates over the floating gates?)

We highlighted a track per fuse in the above photos. What do you think these red tracks might represent?

INSIGHTS | January 22, 2008

Security Mechanism of PIC16C558,620,621,622

By IOActive

Last month we talked about the structure of an AND-gate layed out in Silicon CMOS. Now, we present to you how this AND gate has been used in Microchip PICs such as PIC16C558, PIC16C620, PIC16C621, PIC16C622, and a variety of others.

If you wish to determine if this article relates to a particular PIC you may be in possession of, you can take an windowed OTP part (/JW) and set the lock-bits. If after 10 minutes in UV, it still says it’s locked, this article applies to your PIC.

IF THE PART REMAINS LOCKED, IT CANNOT BE UNLOCKED SO TEST AT YOUR OWN RISK.

The picture above is the die of the PIC16C558 magnified 100x. The PIC16C620-622 look pretty much the same. If there are letters after the final number, the die will be most likely, “shrunk” (e.g. PIC16C622 vs PIC16C622A).

Our area of concern is highlighted above along with a zoom of the area.

When magnified 500x, things become clear. Notice the top metal (M2) is covering our DUAL 2-Input AND gate in the red box above.We previously showed you one half of the above area. Now you can see that there is a pair of 2-input AND gates. This was done to offer two security lock-bits for memory regions (read the datasheet on special features of the CPU).Stripping off that top metal (M2) now clearly shows us the bussing from two different areas to keep the part secure. Microchip went the extra step of covering the floating gate of the main easilly discoverable fuses with metal to prevent UV from erasing a locked state. The outputs of those two fuses also feed into logic on the left side of the picture to tell you that the part is locked during a device readback of the configuration fuses.

This type of fuse is protected by multiple set fuses of which only some are UV-erasable.

The AND gates are ensuring all fuses are erased to a ‘1’ to “unlock” the device.

What does this mean to an attacker? It means, go after the inal AND gate if you want to forcefully unlock the CPU. The outputs of the final AND gate stage run underneather VDD!! (The big mistake Microchip made). Two shots witha laser-cutter and we can short the output stages “Y” from the AND-gate to a logic ‘1’ allowing readback of the memories (the part will still say it is locked).Stripping off the lower metal layer (M1) reveils the Poly-silicon layer.

What have we learned from all this?

- A lot of time and effort went into the design of this series of security mechanisms.
- These are the most secure Microchip PICs of ALL currently available. The latest ~350-400nm 3-4 metal layer PICs are less secure than the
- Anything made by human can be torn down by human!

:->

INSIGHTS | December 29, 2007

AND Gates in logic

By IOActive

As we prepare for the New Year, we wanted to leave you with a piece of logic taken out of an older PIC16C series microcontroller. We want you to guess which micro(s) this gate (well the pair of them) would be found in. After the New Year, we’ll right up on the actual micro(s) and give the answer :).

An AND gate in logic is basically a high (logic ‘1’) on all inputs to the gate. For our example, we’re discussing the 2 input AND. It should be noted that this is being built from a NAND and that a NAND would require 2 less gates than an AND.

The truth table is all inputs must be a ‘1’ to get a ‘1’ on the output (Y). If any input is a ‘0’, Y = ‘0’.

There are 2 signals we labeled ‘A’ and ‘B’ routed in the Poly layer of the substrate (under all the metal). This particular circuit is not on the top of the device and had another metal layer above it (Metal 2 or M2). So technically, you are seeing Metal 1 (M1) and lower (Poly, Diffusion).

It’s quickly obvious that this is an AND gate but it could also be a NAND by removing the INVERTER and taking the ‘!Y’ signal instead of ‘Y’.

The red box to the left is the NAND leaving the red box to the right being the inverter creating our AND gate.

The upper green area are PFET’s with the lower green area being NFET’s.

After stripping off M1, we now can clearly see the Poly layer and begin to recognize the circuit.

This is a short article and we will follow up after the New Year begins. This is a single AND gate but was part of a pair. From the pair, this was the right side. We call them a pair because they work together to provide the security feature on some of the PIC16C’s we’re asking you to guess which ones 🙂

Happy Holidays and Happy Guessing!

INSIGHTS | December 17, 2007

ST201: ST16601 Smartcard Teardown

By IOActive

ST SmartCards 201 – Introduction to the ST16601 Secure MCU

This piece is going to be split into two articles-

- The first being this article is actually a primer on all of the ST16XYZ series smartcards using this type of Mesh technology. They have overgone a few generations. We consider this device to be a 3rd generation.
- In a seperate article yet to come, we are going to apply what you have read here to a smartcard used by Sun Microsystems, Inc. called Payflex. From what we have gathered on the internet, they are used to control access to Sun Ray Ultra Thin Terminals. Speaking of the payflex cards, they are commonly found (new and used) on eBay.

The ST16601 originated as far back as 1994. It originally appeared as a 1.2 um, 1 metal CMOS process and was later shrunk to 0.90 um, 1 metal CMOS to support 2.7v – 5.5v ranges.

It appears to be a later generation of the earlier ST16301 processor featuring larger memories (ROM, RAM, EEPROM).

The ST16601 offers:

- 6805 cpu core with a few additional instructions
- Lower instruction cycle counts vs. Motorola 6805.
- Internal Clock can run upto 5 Mhz at 1:1 vs 2:1.
- 6K Bytes of ROM
- 1K Bytes of EEPROM
- 128 Bytes of RAM
- Very high security features including EEPROM flash erase (bulk-erase)

Although it was released in 1994 it was being advertised in articles back in 1996. Is it possible an ‘A’ version of the ST16601 was released without a mesh? We know the ST16301 was so anything is possible.

Final revision of the ST16601(C?). The part has been shrunk to 0.90um and now has ST’s 2nd generation mesh in place. The newer mesh still in use today consists of fingers connected to ground and a serpentine sense line connected to power (VDD).

Using our delayering techniques, we removed the top metal mesh from the 1997 version of the part. The part numbering system was changed in 1995 onward to not tell you what part something really is. You have to be knowledgable about the features present and then play match-up from their website to determine the real part number.

As you can see, this part is clearly an ST16601 part except it is now called a K3COA. We know that the ‘3’ represents the entire ST16XYZ series from 1995-1997 but we’ll get into their numbering system when we write the ST101 article (we skipped it and jumped straight to ST201 to bring you the good stuff sooner!).

Above: 1000x magnification of the beginning of the second generation mesh used ont he 1995+ parts. This exact mesh is still used today on their latest technology sporting 0.18um and smaller! The difference- the wire size and spacing.

In the above image, green is ground, red is connected to power (VDD). Breaking this could result in loss of ground to a lower layer as well as the sense itself. The device will not run with a broken mesh.

Flylogic has successfully broken their mesh and we did it without the use of a Focus Ion-Beam workstation (FIB). In fact, we are the ONLY ONES who can open the ST mesh at our leisure and invasively probe whatever we want. We’ve been sucessful down-to 0.18um.

Using our techniques we call, “magic” (okay, it’s not magic but we’re not telling 😉 ), we opened the bus and probed it keeping the chip alive. We didn’t use any kind of expensive SEM or FIB. The equipment used was available back in the 90’s to the average hacker! We didn’t even need a university lab. Everything we used was commonly available for under $100.00 USD.

This is pretty scary when you think that they are certifying these devices under all kinds of certifications around the world.

Stay tuned for more articles on ST smartcards. We wanted to show you some old-school devices before showing you current much smaller ones because you have to learn to crawl before you walk!

INSIGHTS | December 1, 2007

Infineon SLE4442

By IOActive

The SLE4442 has been around for a long time. Spanning a little more than 10 years in the field, it has only now began to be replaced by the newer SLE5542 (We have analyzed this device too and will write up an article soon).

It is basically a 256 byte 8 bit wide EEPROM with special write protection. In order to successfully write to the device, you need to know a 3 byte password called the Programmable Security Code (PSC). The code is locked tightly inside the memory area of the device and if you try to guess it, you have 3 tries before being permanently locked out forever (well forever for some, we can always perform magic on the part).o above is a picture shows the entire substrate.

There was still some dirt on the die but it didn’t effect our interests. The geometry of the device is pretty big (> 2 uM). It has one polysilicon layer and one metal layer fabricated using an NMOS process.

Note: Just because the device is big does not constitute ease of an attack but it does make execution of an attack easier for an attacker without large amount of expense.

A successful attack on this device means an attacker knows the PSC which enables write operations to the device under attack or the ability to clone the device under attack into fresh new target who can act like the original device. We’ll discuss the PSC in more detail below.We have pr identified all the important areas listed on the Page 7 diagram in the above picture.

We can see again a test circuit that has had its enable sawn off during production. We can see the enable line looping back for the die that was placed to the right of this die. Notice the duck? Hrmmmm… Seems to be pointing at 2 test points. We’ll just say that the duck probably knows what he’s looking at 😉

We removed the top metal (the only metal layer) and you can now see the diffusion and poly layers. You can literally take these two pictures above and create a schematic from them if you understand NMOS circuits.

Possible attacks on the device:

- Electrical glitches: Fed through VCC / CLOCK line are possible. The circuit latches are all toggled from the serial clock provided by the user.
- Optical Erasure: UV seems to clear cells of the EEPROM to zero. Masking of the EEPROM except for the 3 PSC bytes would result in a PSC of $00,$00,$00 for that particular device. However note this is not a favorable attack as the device would probably become rejected by the host that this device belongs too.
- Optical glitches: These give strange results. An optical glitch in the right area might produce readback of the PSC code through command $31 (Read Security Memory).
- Bus attacks: Sitting on the databus will show you the PSC of the device. This method is effective but not easilly accomplish by most.
- PSC Control logic: Find the right signal in this area and you can make the device believe a valid PSC has been previously given allowing readback of the PSC through command $31. This is our prefered method, just ask the duck ;).

The security model used on this type of device is one in which the host-environment is trusted. This is a risky way of thinking but ironically, it has been used a lot (Fedex/Kinko’s payment cards(SLE4442, SLE5542), Telephone cards in use worldwide (ST1335, ST1355), laundry machine smartcards (AT88SC102).

Proof of failure of this trust model has been shown in places such as:

- Phone card emulation in Europe. It became so bad, metal detectors were placed inside the phones smartcard area to deter eavesdropping.
- Fedex/Kinko’s was successfully compromised by a man named Strom Carlson. He demonstrated the abuse of the SLE4442 in use by Kinko’s at the time.