INSIGHTS | August 4, 2026

Cyber Attack Trends 2026: What Security Teams Face

Cyber Attack Trends 2026 at the Silicon Level; Firmware, Silicon, Software Supply Chains, Industrial Control Systems.

“The most significant cyber attacks of 2026 will target the systems organizations depend on most, not the systems they monitor most closely.”

Most cybersecurity forecasts treat ransomware, AI-enabled attacks, and supply chain risks as parallel threats of equal weight; a framing that produces the wrong priorities for security teams protecting complex organizations. The cyber attack trends in 2026 share a specific characteristic: they exploit environments organizations depend on most but monitor least, from industrial control systems running legacy protocols to firmware supply chains lacking integrity verification. This article evaluates which attack patterns represent confirmed, active risk across key threat categories.

ThreatKey Risk IndicatorLevel of ConcernRecommended Assessment
Ransomware

Targeting OT and critical infrastructure
$74B global damage projected¹EscalatingRed team, OT security assessments
Software Supply Chain Attacks

Build pipelines, open-source dependencies
$80.6B cost projection by 2026²UnderestimatedSecure development lifecycle (SDL)
OT/ICS Threats

PLCs, RTUs, engineering workstations
3,300+ industrial orgs impacted³UnderdetectedOT/ICS security assessment
AI-Enabled Attacks

Dev pipelines, social engineering
31.6% of AI code fully exploitableMixed: some confirmed, some speculativeSecure code review, SDL
Critical Infrastructure Cyberattacks

Energy, water, transport, defense
$4.82M average breach costUnderreportedFull-stack ICS/OT assessment

Ransomware: From File Encryption to Operational Disruption

Ransomware groups have moved beyond encrypting files and demanding payment. The operational model has shifted toward the targeted disruption of systems that organizations cannot quickly stop or replace.

Ransomware incidents reached 6,500 in 2025, up from under 1,400 in 2020, a more than 360% increase over five years. Global damage costs are projected to reach $74 billion in 2026, a 30% increase from $57 billion in 2025.¹ For organizations in critical sectors, the average breach cost stands at $4.82 million per incident, excluding production loss and regulatory response.

Ransomware CharacteristicTraditional Model (Pre-2022)2026 ModelRecommended Assessment
Primary objectiveFile encryption, ransom demandOperational disruption plus ransomOT incident response planning
Target selectionOpportunistic, volume-basedSector-targeted, timing-awareThreat modeling
OT environment knowledgeLowActive, documented reconnaissanceOT security assessment
Recovery timelineHours to days (IT)Days to weeks (OT)OT business continuity review
Payment pressure leverThreat of data exposureExtended process downtimeRed team exercise

How Threat Groups Are Targeting OT Environments

The threat model has changed in a specific way. Groups with OT knowledge now time attacks around operational windows: peak demand periods for energy utilities, scheduled maintenance cycles at manufacturers, pre-harvest windows in agricultural processing. Dragos tracked 3,300 industrial organizations affected by ransomware in 2025.³ These are not random hits. They reflect adversaries who understand operational context well enough to maximize financial leverage.

What Separates Fast Recovery From Extended Downtime

Organizations recovering fastest from ransomware incidents are those that have run realistic OT continuity exercises against adversary scenarios. Applying untested IT recovery playbooks to industrial environments results in extended downtime because the two environments fail differently and recover on different timelines.

Software Supply Chain Attacks: The Dominant Third-Party Risk Vector

The SolarWinds compromise in 2020 demonstrated that trusted software update mechanisms could deliver malware to thousands of organizations simultaneously. The XZ Utils backdoor in 2024 showed that state-sponsored actors were willing to invest years in maintaining access to open-source projects before activating a payload. Neither incident was an outlier. Both represent a confirmed shift in how sophisticated threat actors approach access at scale.

Supply Chain Attack TypeNotable CaseDetection DifficultyDownstream ScopeRecommended Assessment
Software build tool compromiseSolarWinds (2020)High18,000+ organizationsSecure development lifecycle (SDL) review
Open-source package backdoorXZ Utils (2024)HighMillions of Linux systemsSoftware composition analysis
Firmware implantVendor hardware (multiple)Very highFull device lifecycleFirmware security assessment
AI model poisoningEmerging (2025–2026)Very highDevelopment pipelinesAI supply chain review
Hardware and silicon-level attackAMD Sinkclose (2024)⁷Extremely highEndpoint device fleetsSilicon security assessment

Third-Party Risk Is Growing Faster Than Programs Can Track

Third-party involvement in security breaches rose from 15% to 30% in 2025.² Supply chain attack costs are projected to exceed $80.6 billion by 2026.² The attack surface is not shrinking: organizations now average over 1,000 third-party vendors, and the majority lack visibility into the security posture of their software dependencies beyond first-tier vendors.

One Compromise Can Expose Every Downstream Organization

The risk is systemic, not incidental. A single compromise of a widely used build tool, package manager, or firmware update process exposes every downstream organization that relies on it. Your environment’s security now depends in part on the security of every component that touches your build pipeline, whether or not you have audited it.

OT/ICS Threats: Adversaries Mapping Physical Processes

The 2026 Dragos OT Cybersecurity Year in Review documents a specific evolution in how adversaries approach industrial environments. They are no longer staging for future disruption. They are actively mapping control loops to understand how to manipulate physical processes with precision.³

OT Threat GroupPrimary Target SectorDocumented 2025 ActivityICS Kill Chain StageRecommended Assessment
VOLTZITEElectric, oil and gasGateway compromise, configuration extractionStage 2OT network security assessment
KAMACITEEnergy, water, heating (EU, US)Four-month ICS reconnaissance campaignStage 1ICS threat hunting
ELECTRUMUkrainian, Polish infrastructureDestructive wiper deployment (PathWiper)³Stage 2OT incident response planning
SYLVANITEUS utilities, SAP environmentsZero-day exploitation (CVE-2025-31324)Stage 1Vulnerability assessment
BAUXITEIsraeli critical infrastructureDual wiper variants deployedStage 2Full-stack ICS/OT assessment

Active OT Threat Groups

Three new OT threat groups emerged in 2025. Established groups expanded operations globally. Dragos now tracks 26 OT threat groups.³ KAMACITE conducted four months of sustained reconnaissance against US internet-exposed ICS assets, targeting specific device types in sequence. VOLTZITE compromised Sierra Wireless Airlink gateways across electric and oil-and-gas sectors, then pivoted to engineering workstations to extract configuration and alarm data. ELECTRUM deployed coordinated destructive wiper malware against eight Ukrainian ISPs and, in December 2025, Polish CHP facilities.³

Why Most Organizations Cannot See the Threat

The visibility problem is structural. Only 30% of OT networks have the monitoring capability to detect these threats before operational impact. 56% of organizations cannot see below the IT/OT boundary. 88% struggle with detection and response in OT environments.³

The Integrity Blind Spot Adversaries Exploit

IOActive’s research into OT security architecture has identified a persistent strategic blind spot. The standard AIC reordering (Availability-Integrity-Confidentiality) used in many OT environments prioritizes availability, which is precisely where the most capable adversaries operate. Stuxnet manipulated centrifuge speeds while feeding false readings to operators for months. Triton/TRISIS targeted Safety Instrumented Systems to remove the safeguard layer before causing process failure. Industroyer sent commands directly to substation equipment using native industrial protocols. All three targeted integrity, not availability, because integrity failures often go undetected, whereas availability failures trigger an immediate response.

AI-Enabled Attacks: Separating Confirmed Risk From Speculation

AI’s role in offensive security requires more precision than most threat briefings provide. The meaningful 2026 risk is not the speculative scenario of fully autonomous AI attackers. It is the measurable deterioration in code security caused by AI-assisted development tools, and the accelerated pace at which phishing and social engineering campaigns now operate.

AI Attack VectorOperational MaturityDocumented Risk IndicatorDefender PriorityRecommended Assessment
AI-generated insecure code in productionHigh31.6% of samples fully exploitableCriticalSecure code review, SDL
AI-accelerated phishing and spear-phishingHighVolume and personalization increase confirmedHighSocial engineering assessment
Deepfake-based social engineering and fraudMedium-HighActive in financial and executive targetingHighRed team exercise
AI-assisted vulnerability discovery by threat actorsMediumBeing used by advanced groupsMediumThreat modeling
Autonomous AI attack agentsLowDemonstration cases only; no confirmed deployment at scaleMonitor onlyNo immediate action required

AI-Generated Code Is Already a Security Liability

IOActive’s April 2026 whitepaper evaluated 27 leading AI models and AI-powered coding tools using 730 real-world programming prompts across 27 languages and 219 vulnerability categories. Security outcomes were measured against 72 automated vulnerability detectors, producing nearly 20,000 analyzed code samples. The results were direct: average security performance across all models was 59%, and 31.6% of AI-generated code samples were fully exploitable.

No model achieved 100% secure output. Infrastructure and DevOps code (Dockerfiles, Terraform, CI/CD pipelines) produced the worst results, with vulnerability rates between 70% and 97%. Authentication, rate limiting, and cryptography consistently failed across nearly all models. According to IOActive’s research, GitHub Copilot is now generating nearly half of developers’ code. Organizations deploying AI coding tools without mandatory security review before production deployment are introducing exploitable risk at scale as a present, documented condition.

Where AI Is Accelerating Offensive Capabilities

The WEF Global Cybersecurity Outlook 2026 found that 87% of respondents identified AI-related vulnerabilities as the fastest-growing cyber risk over 2025. AI is accelerating phishing volume, enabling more convincing social engineering, and lowering the technical barrier for credential-based attacks.

Critical Infrastructure: The Widening Gap Between Visibility and Exposure

64% of organizations now account for geopolitically motivated cyberattacks against critical infrastructure in their 2026 risk strategies. 91% of the world’s largest organizations have changed their cybersecurity strategies due to geopolitical volatility. Awareness has grown. Technical detection coverage has not kept pace with it.

Critical Infrastructure SectorPrimary 2026 Threat VectorCurrent Avg. VisibilityRecommended Assessment
Energy (grid and generation)OT compromise, wiper malwareLow (30% avg. OT visibility³)Full-stack ICS/OT assessment
Water and wastewaterICS manipulation, ransomwareVery lowOT network segmentation review
TelecommunicationsSupply chain implants, espionageMediumHardware and firmware audit
TransportationEmbedded system attacks, GPS manipulationLowEmbedded systems assessment
Defense industrial baseHardware supply chain, insider accessVariableSilicon-level security review

Active Campaigns Against Energy Infrastructure

The December 2025 coordinated attack on Polish CHP facilities and renewable energy management systems, attributed by Dragos to Russian state-linked actors consistent with ELECTRUM, confirmed that energy infrastructure in NATO-aligned countries is an active target.³ The same month, a new destructive wiper variant from ELECTRUM confirmed an active malware development pipeline. These are not isolated incidents: they reflect sustained, organized campaigns with documented capability to disrupt physical processes.

Where Conventional Monitoring Falls Short

IOActive’s critical infrastructure research spans SATCOM terminal vulnerabilities across aviation, maritime, and military systems; avionics security in DAL-A certified systems; and industrial control assessments across energy, chemical, and defense sectors. That body of work consistently surfaces the same pattern: the most consequential vulnerabilities reside in layers below where most monitoring tools operate. Software-layer monitoring does not detect the reconnaissance and lateral movement techniques being used by the most capable OT threat groups.

For organizations in these sectors, sophisticated adversaries have both the motive and the documented capability to access environments through the layers that receive the least security scrutiny. The more urgent question is whether that access is already established.

Which of these five threat categories should security teams prioritize first?

OT/ICS threats and software supply chain attacks warrant the highest priority for organizations that have not assessed them recently, because both operate below the visibility threshold of most existing monitoring tools. Ransomware remains the highest-volume threat. AI-enabled attacks require immediate attention in development pipelines. Specifically, autonomous-AI attack scenarios do not warrant the same urgency as the confirmed, active attack patterns documented above.

How should security teams distinguish real business risk from vendor-amplified hype?

Apply two tests. First: Does the threat have documented, confirmed use in real environments, not proof-of-concept demonstrations? Second: Does it target environments your organization depends on but under-monitors? Threats that pass both tests warrant defense investment. Threats that fail the first should be tracked, but should not displace attention from attack patterns already operating at scale.

IOActive’s assessments are grounded in research spanning hardware, firmware, embedded systems, industrial control systems, and live adversarial engagements across industries. Most threat intelligence derives from network-layer telemetry. IOActive’s research includes silicon-level attack techniques, OT protocol analysis, and hardware supply chain evaluation, which is where the most consequential vulnerabilities in 2026 are concentrated. Learn more about IOActive’s Full-Stack Security Assessment approach.

Attackers Target the Layers You Are Not Watching

The cyberattack trends in 2026 share one thing in common: they target the layers that most organizations aren’t watching. IOActive’s research spans silicon, firmware, OT, and live adversarial engagements, giving security teams a complete picture of where real exposure exists and what to do about it.

Sources

1. Cybersecurity Ventures, via SLCyber (2026). The True Cost of a Ransomware Attack in 2026. https://slcyber.io/blog/the-true-cost-of-a-ransomware-attack-in-2026/

2. Vectra AI / Think Ahead Tech (2025–2026). Supply chain attack cost and third-party breach data. https://www.vectra.ai/topics/supply-chain-attack; https://think-ahead.tech/en/blog/software-supplychain-security

3. Dragos. 2026 OT Cybersecurity Year in Review. https://www.dragos.com/ot-cybersecurity-year-in-review

4. IOActive. The Security Gap in AI-Generated Code (April 2026). https://www.ioactive.com/the-security-gap-in-ai-generated-code/

5. IBM. Cost of a Data Breach Report 2025, via StationX. https://app.stationx.net/articles/ransomware-statistics

6. Industrial Cyber. Hacktivists and Cybercriminals Expand Attacks on ICS, OT, and AI Systems Across Critical Infrastructure. https://industrialcyber.co/reports/hacktivists-and-cybercriminals-expand-attacks-on-ics-ot-and-ai-systems-across-critical-infrastructure/

7. IOActive. Tales from the Call Gate: AMD Sinkclose Vulnerability (2024). https://ioactive.com/tales-from-the-call-gate-an-smm-supervisor-vulnerability/

8. IOActive. Rethinking the CIA Triad in Operational Technology Environments (2026). https://www.ioactive.com/rethinking-the-cia-triad-in-operational-technology-environments/

9. World Economic Forum. Global Cybersecurity Outlook 2026 (January 2026). https://reports.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Global_Cybersecurity_Outlook_2026.pdf

RESEARCH | March 9, 2018

Robots Want Bitcoins too!

Ransomware attacks have boomed during the last few years, becoming a preferred method for cybercriminals to get monetary profit by encrypting victim information and requiring a ransom to get the information back. The primary ransomware target has always been information. When a victim has no backup of that information, he panics, forced to pay for its return.
(more…)

INSIGHTS | June 28, 2017

WannaCry vs. Petya: Keys to Ransomware Effectiveness

With WannaCry and now Petya we’re beginning to see how and why the new strain of ransomware worms are evolving and growing far more effective than previous versions.

I think there are 3 main factors: Propagation, Payload, and Payment.*

  1. Propagation: You ideally want to be able to spread using as many different types of techniques as you can.
  2. Payload: Once you’ve infected the system you want to have a payload that encrypts properly, doesn’t have any easy bypass to decryption, and clearly indicates to the victim what they should do next.
  3. Payment: You need to be able to take in money efficiently and then actually decrypt the systems of those who pay. This piece is crucial, otherwise people will quickly learn they can’t get their files back even if they do pay and be inclined to just start over.


WannaCry vs. Petya

WannaCry used SMB as its main spreading mechanism, and its payment infrastructure lacked the ability to scale. It also had a kill switch, which was famously triggered and halted further propagation.

Petya on the other hand appears to be much more effective at spreading since it’s using both EternalBlue and credential sharing
/ PSEXEC to infect more systems. This means it can harvest working credentials and spread even if the new targets aren’t vulnerable to an exploit.


[NOTE: This is early analysis so some details could turn out to be different as we learn more.]

What remains to be seen is how effective the payload and payment infrastructures are on this one. It’s one thing to encrypt files, but it’s something else entirely to decrypt them.

The other important unknown at this point is if Petya is standalone or a component of a more elaborate attack. Is what we’re seeing now intended to be a compelling distraction?
  
There’s been some reports indicating these exploits were utilized by a sophisticated threat actor against the same targets prior to WannaCry. So it’s possible that WannaCry was poorly designed on purpose. Either way, we’re advising clients to investigate if there is any evidence of a more strategic use of these tools in the weeks leading up to Petya hitting.   

*Note: I’m sure there are many more thorough ways to analyze the efficacy of worms. These are just three that came to mind while reading about Petya and thinking about it compared to WannaCry.

INSIGHTS | May 16, 2017

#WannaCry: Examining Weaponized Malware

Attribution: You Keep Using That Word, I Do Not Think It Means What You Think It Means…

In internal discussions in virtual halls of IOActive this morning, there were many talks about the collective industry’s rush to blame or attribution over the recent WanaCry/WannaCrypt ransomware breakouts. Twitter was lit up on #Wannacry and #WannaCrypt and even Microsoft got into the action, stating, We need governments to consider the damage to civilians that comes from hoarding these vulnerabilities and the use of these exploits.”

Opinions for blame and attribution spanned the entire spectrum of response, from the relatively sane…

…to the sublimely sarcastic.

As a community, we can talk and debate who did what, and why, but in the end it really doesn’t matter. Literally, none (well, almost none) of us outside the government or intelligence communities have any impact on the discussion of attribution. Even for the government, attribution is hard to nearly impossible to do reliably, and worse – is now politicized and drawn out in the court of public opinion. The digital ink on malware or Internet attacks is hardly even dry, yet experts are already calling out “Colonel Mustard, Lead Pipe, Study” before we even know what the malware is fully capable of doing. We insist on having these hyperbolic discussions where we wax poetic about the virtues of the NSA vs. Microsoft vs. state actors.
 

It’s more important to focus on the facts and what can be observed in the behavioral characteristics of the malware and what organizations need to do to prevent infection now and in the future. 

How people classify them varies, but there are essentially three different classes of weaponized malware:

  • Semi-automatic/automatic kits that exploit “all the things.”These are the Confickers, Code-red, SQL Slamming Melissa’s of the world
  • Manual/point targeted kits that exploit “one thing at a time.” These are the types of kit that Shadow Brokers dropped. Think of these as black market, crew-served weapons, such as MANPADS
  • Automatic point target exploit kits that exploit based on specific target telemetry AND are remotely controllable in flight. This includes Stuxnet. Think of these as the modern cyber equivalent of cruise missiles

Nation state toolkits are typically elegant. As we know, ETERNALBLUE was part of a greater framework/toolkit. Whoever made WannaCrypt/Cry deconstructed a well written (by all accounts thus far) complex mechanism for point target use, and made a blunt force weapon of part of it. Of those three types above, nation states moved on from the first one over a decade ago because they’re not controllable and they don’t meet the clandestine nature that today’s operators require. Nation states typically prefer type two; however, this requires bi-directional, fully routed IP connectivity to function correctly. When you cannot get to the network or asset in question, type three is your only option. In that instance, you build in the targeting telemetry for the mission and send it on its way. This requires a massive amount of upfront HUMINT and SIGINT for targeting telemetry. As you can imagine, the weaponized malware in type three is both massive in size and in sunk cost.

WannaCry/WanaCrypt is certainly NOT types two or three and it appears that corners were cut in creating the malware. The community was very quick in actively reversing the package and it doesn’t appear that any major anti-reversing or anti-tampering methods were used. Toss in the well-publicized and rudimentary “kill switch” component and this appears almost sloppy and lacks conviction. I can think of at least a dozen more elegant command and control functions it could have implemented to leave control in the hands of the malware author. Anyone with reverse engineering skills would eventually find this “kill switch” and disable it using a hex editor to modifying a JMP instruction. Compare this to Conficker, which had password brute-forcing capabilities as well as the ability to pivot after installation and infect other hosts without the use of exploits, but rather through simple login after passwords were identified.

This doesn’t mean that WannaCry/WanaCrypt is not dangerous, on the contrary depending upon the data impacted, its consequences could be devastating. For example, impacting the safety builder controlling Safety Instrumented Systems, locking operators out of the Human Machine Interfaces (HMI’s, or computers used in industrial control environments) could lead to dangerous process failures. Likewise, loss of regulatory data that exists in environmental control systems, quality systems, historians, or other critical ICS assets could open a facility up to regulatory action. Critical infrastructure asset owners typically have horrific patch cycles with equally appalling backup and disaster recovery strategies. And if businesses are hit with this attack and lose critical data, it may open up a door to legal action for failure to follow due care and diligence to protect these systems. It’s clear this ransomware is going to be a major pain for quite some time. Due care and preventative strategies should be taken by asset owners everywhere to keep their operations up and running in the safest and secure manner possible.

It really doesn’t do much good to philosophically discuss attribution, or play as a recent hashtag calls it, the #smbBlameGame. It’s relatively clear that this is amateur hour in the cybercrime space. With a lot of people panicking about this being the “next cyber cruise missile” or equivalent, I submit that this is more akin to digital malaria.

INSIGHTS | May 13, 2017

We’re gonna need a bigger boat….

A few weeks ago back in mid-March (2017), Microsoft issued a security bulletin (MS17-010) and patch for a vulnerability that was yet to be publicly disclosed or referenced. According to the bulletin, “the most severe of the vulnerabilities could allow remote code execution if an attacker sends specially crafted messages to a Microsoft Server Message Block 1.0 (SMBv1) server. This security update is rated Critical for all supported releases of Microsoft Windows.

Normally, when Microsoft issues a patch or security there is an acknowledgment on their website regarding the disclosure. Below is the website and it is an interesting process, at this point, to make a visit. https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/security/mt745121.aspx

Notice anything?  MS17-010 is conspicuous in its absence.


It is often said that timing is everything, and in this case, Microsoft beat the clock. Exactly one month later, on 14 April 2017, ShadowBrokers dropped a fifth in a series of leaks supposedly associated with the NSA which included an exploit codenamed ETERNALBLUE. Flashing forward to today almost one full month later this payload has been weaponized and, over the last few hours, has been used in a rash of ransomware attacks throughout the UK, mainland Europe, and western Asia.
UK Hospitals Hit in Widespread Ransomware Attack
NSA Exploit Used by Wannacry Ransomware in Global Explosion
Spain Ransomware Outbreak

 

Considering the timing, one could be inclined to consider that this was not just Microsoft’s good fortune.

 

While pretty much the entire wired world is rushing to patch MS17-010, even though that patch has been out for almost two months, there is one technology area that is cause for particular concern especially when it comes to ransomware. This area of concern is the global industrial environments.

Historically, general purpose, run of the mill malware that leverages SMB and NetBIOS interfaces in the industrial environment are particularly troublesome, with many systems remaining infected many years later. Besides ICS environments being in an operational state that complicates the life of those seeking to patch them, some of these legacy systems often use a protocol called Object linking and embedding for Process Control (OLE for Process Control, or OPC for short). OPC Classic (a legacy protocol implementation), relies on the Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM) which makes heavy use of the Distributed Computing Environment / Remote Procedure Calls (DCE/RPC) protocol. 

In addition to NetBIOS and depending on both configuration and implementation, SMB is one of the interfaces that can be leveraged by these other services. Because both NetBIOS and SMB are needed in some manner by ICS software and protocols, many ICS systems have been negatively impacted by malware leveraging SMB and NetBIOS attacks reaching back well over a decade.


Consider the major, well-known examples of malware impacting the ICS space. In November of 2008, the first variant of Conficker was publicly identified and due to the ICS requirements of keeping the NetBIOS and SMB ports open, Conficker is still found to this day. Conficker exploited MS08-067 and due to its password brute forcing capability, is incredibly resilient to remediation attempt at the system level. Another major example that utilized the attack vector in MS08-067 was Stuxnet. We all know how that turned out.  MS17-010 has the potential to be every bit as damaging and in some ways much worse.

With the WannaCry/WanaCrypt ransomware in the wild, crossing into industrial control systems would be particularly devastating. Systems requiring real-time interfacing and control influence over physical assets could face safety/critical shutdown, or worse. When thinking about critical services to modern society (power, water, wastewater, etc.), there is a real potential, potentially for the first time ever, where critical services could be suspended due to ransomware. It may be time to rethink critical infrastructure cybersecurity engineering because if MS17-010 exploiting malware variants are successful, we are clearly doing something wrong.