Real quick image as posted on Facebook tech .at. flylogic.net profile. A Total of 4 overlayed images of a small section of an NEC upd78F9210 MCU.
A FlipFlop and a few AND’s were quickly spotted. Can you find them?
Real quick image as posted on Facebook tech .at. flylogic.net profile. A Total of 4 overlayed images of a small section of an NEC upd78F9210 MCU.
A FlipFlop and a few AND’s were quickly spotted. Can you find them?
See if you can find the backdoor, I’ll post the explanation and details on the flaw soon.
// eBookLib.cpp : main project file.
// Project requirements
// Add/Remove/Query eBooks
// One code file (KISS in effect)
//
//
// **** Mostly generated from Visual Studio project templates ****
//
#define WIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN
#define _WIN32_WINNT 0x501
#include <windows.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <wchar.h>
#include <msclrmarshal.h>
#using <Microsoft.VisualC.dll>
#using <System.dll>
#using <System.Core.dll>
using namespace System;
using namespace System::IO;
using namespace System::Threading;
using namespace System::Threading::Tasks;
using namespace System::Reflection;
using namespace System::Diagnostics;
using namespace System::Globalization;
using namespace System::Collections::Generic;
using namespace System::Security::Permissions;
using namespace System::Runtime::InteropServices;
using namespace System::IO::MemoryMappedFiles;
using namespace System::IO;
using namespace System::Runtime::CompilerServices;
using namespace msclr;
using namespace msclr::interop;
//
// General Information about an assembly is controlled through the following
// set of attributes. Change these attribute values to modify the information
// associated with an assembly.
//
[assembly:AssemblyTitleAttribute(“eBookLib”)];
[assembly:AssemblyDescriptionAttribute(“”)];
[assembly:AssemblyConfigurationAttribute(“”)];
[assembly:AssemblyCompanyAttribute(“Microsoft”)];
[assembly:AssemblyProductAttribute(“eBookLib”)];
[assembly:AssemblyCopyrightAttribute(“Copyright (c) Microsoft 2010”)];
[assembly:AssemblyTrademarkAttribute(“”)];
[assembly:AssemblyCultureAttribute(“”)];
//
// Version information for an assembly consists of the following four values:
//
// Major Version
// Minor Version
// Build Number
// Revision
//
// You can specify all the value or you can default the Revision and Build Numbers
// by using the ‘*’ as shown below:
[assembly:AssemblyVersionAttribute(“1.0.*”)];
[assembly:ComVisible(false)];
[assembly:CLSCompliantAttribute(true)];
[assembly:SecurityPermission(SecurityAction::RequestMinimum, UnmanagedCode = true)];
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
// Native structures used from legacy system,
// define the disk storage for our ebook,
//
// The file specified by the constructor is read from and loaded automatically, it is also auto saved when closed.
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
enum eBookFlag
{
NOFLAG = 0,
ACTIVE = 1,
PENDING_REMOVE = 2
};
typedef struct _eBookAccountingData
{
// Binary Data, may include nulls
char PurchaseOrder[ACCOUNTING_SIZE];
char RecieptData[ACCOUNTING_SIZE];
size_t PurchaseOrderLength;
size_t RecieptDataLength;
} eBookAccountingData, *PeBookAccountingData;
typedef struct _eBookPublicData
{
wchar_t ISBN[BUFSIZ];
wchar_t MISC[BUFSIZ];
wchar_t ShortName[BUFSIZ];
wchar_t Author[BUFSIZ];
wchar_t LongName[BUFSIZ];
wchar_t PathToFile[MAX_PATH];
int Rating;
int SerialNumber;
} eBookPublicData, *PeBookPublicData;
typedef struct _eBook
{
eBookFlag Flag;
eBookAccountingData Priv;
eBookPublicData Pub;
} eBook, *PeBook;
// define managed analogues for native/serialized types
namespace Client {
namespace ManagedEbookLib {
[System::FlagsAttribute]
public enum class ManagedeBookFlag : int
{
NOFLAG = 0x0,
ACTIVE = 0x1,
PENDING_REMOVE = 0x2,
};
public ref class ManagedEbookPublic
{
public:
__clrcall ManagedEbookPublic()
{
ISBN = MISC = ShortName = Author = LongName = PathToFile = String::Empty;
}
Int32 Rating;
String^ ISBN;
String^ MISC;
Int32 SerialNumber;
String^ ShortName;
String^ Author;
String^ LongName;
String^ PathToFile;
};
public ref class ManagedEbookAccounting
{
public:
__clrcall ManagedEbookAccounting()
{
PurchaseOrder = gcnew array<Byte>(0);
RecieptData = gcnew array<Byte>(0);
}
array<Byte>^ PurchaseOrder;
array<Byte>^ RecieptData;
};
public ref class ManagedEbook
{
public:
__clrcall ManagedEbook()
{
Pub = gcnew ManagedEbookPublic();
Priv = gcnew ManagedEbookAccounting();
}
ManagedeBookFlag Flag;
ManagedEbookPublic^ Pub;
ManagedEbookAccounting^ Priv;
array<Byte^>^ BookData;
};
}
}
using namespace Client::ManagedEbookLib;
// extend marshal library for native/managed inter-op
namespace msclr {
namespace interop {
template<>
inline ManagedEbookAccounting^ marshal_as<ManagedEbookAccounting^, eBookAccountingData> (const eBookAccountingData& Src)
{
ManagedEbookAccounting^ Dest = gcnew ManagedEbookAccounting;
if(Src.PurchaseOrderLength > 0 && Src.PurchaseOrderLength < sizeof(Src.PurchaseOrder))
{
Dest->PurchaseOrder = gcnew array<Byte>((int) Src.PurchaseOrderLength);
Marshal::Copy(static_cast<IntPtr>(Src.PurchaseOrder[0]), Dest->PurchaseOrder, 0, (int) Src.PurchaseOrderLength);
}
if(Src.RecieptDataLength > 0 && Src.RecieptDataLength < sizeof(Src.RecieptData))
{
Dest->RecieptData = gcnew array<Byte>((int) Src.RecieptDataLength);
Marshal::Copy(static_cast<IntPtr>(Src.RecieptData[0]), Dest->RecieptData, 0, (int) Src.RecieptDataLength);
}
return Dest;
};
template<>
inline ManagedEbookPublic^ marshal_as<ManagedEbookPublic^, eBookPublicData> (const eBookPublicData& Src) {
ManagedEbookPublic^ Dest = gcnew ManagedEbookPublic;
Dest->Rating = Src.Rating;
Dest->ISBN = gcnew String(Src.ISBN);
Dest->MISC = gcnew String(Src.MISC);
Dest->SerialNumber = Src.SerialNumber;
Dest->ShortName = gcnew String(Src.ShortName);
Dest->Author = gcnew String(Src.Author);
Dest->LongName = gcnew String(Src.LongName);
Dest->PathToFile = gcnew String(Src.PathToFile);
return Dest;
};
template<>
inline ManagedEbook^ marshal_as<ManagedEbook^, eBook> (const eBook& Src) {
ManagedEbook^ Dest = gcnew ManagedEbook;
Dest->Priv = marshal_as<ManagedEbookAccounting^>(Src.Priv);
Dest->Pub = marshal_as<ManagedEbookPublic^>(Src.Pub);
Dest->Flag = static_cast<ManagedeBookFlag>(Src.Flag);
return Dest;
};
}
}
// Primary user namespace
namespace Client
{
namespace ManagedEbooks
{
// “Store” is Client::ManagedEbooks::Store()
public ref class Store
{
private:
String^ DataStore;
List<ManagedEbook^>^ Books;
HANDLE hFile;
// serialization from disk
void __clrcall LoadDB()
{
Books = gcnew List<ManagedEbook^>();
eBook AeBook;
DWORD red = 0;
marshal_context^ x = gcnew marshal_context();
hFile = CreateFileW(x->marshal_as<const wchar_t*>(DataStore), GENERIC_READ | GENERIC_WRITE, FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE | FILE_SHARE_DELETE, 0, OPEN_ALWAYS, 0, 0);
if(hFile == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE)
return;
do {
ReadFile(hFile, &AeBook, sizeof(eBook), &red, NULL);
if(red == sizeof(eBook))
Books->Add(marshal_as<ManagedEbook^>(AeBook));
} while(red == sizeof(eBook));
}
// scan hay for anything that matches needle
bool __clrcall MatchBook(ManagedEbook ^hay, ManagedEbook^ needle)
{
// check numeric values first
if(hay->Pub->Rating != 0 && hay->Pub->Rating == needle->Pub->Rating)
return true;
if(hay->Pub->SerialNumber != 0 && hay->Pub->SerialNumber == needle->Pub->SerialNumber)
return true;
// scan each string
if(!String::IsNullOrEmpty(hay->Pub->ISBN) && hay->Pub->ISBN->Contains(needle->Pub->ISBN))
return true;
if(!String::IsNullOrEmpty(hay->Pub->MISC) && hay->Pub->MISC->Contains(needle->Pub->MISC))
return true;
if(!String::IsNullOrEmpty(hay->Pub->ShortName) && hay->Pub->ShortName->Contains(needle->Pub->ShortName))
return true;
if(!String::IsNullOrEmpty(hay->Pub->Author) && hay->Pub->Author->Contains(needle->Pub->Author))
return true;
if(!String::IsNullOrEmpty(hay->Pub->LongName) && hay->Pub->LongName->Contains(needle->Pub->LongName))
return true;
if(!String::IsNullOrEmpty(hay->Pub->PathToFile) && hay->Pub->PathToFile->Contains(needle->Pub->PathToFile))
return true;
return false;
}
// destructor
__clrcall !Store()
{
Close();
}
// serialization to disk happens here
void __clrcall _Close()
{
if(hFile == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE)
return;
SetFilePointer(hFile, 0, NULL, FILE_BEGIN);
for each(ManagedEbook^ book in Books)
{
eBook save;
DWORD wrote=0;
marshal_context^ x = gcnew marshal_context();
ZeroMemory(&save, sizeof(save));
save.Pub.Rating = book->Pub->Rating;
save.Pub.SerialNumber = book->Pub->SerialNumber;
save.Flag = static_cast<eBookFlag>(book->Flag);
swprintf_s(save.Pub.ISBN, sizeof(save.Pub.ISBN), L”%s”, x->marshal_as<const wchar_t*>(book->Pub->ISBN));
swprintf_s(save.Pub.MISC, sizeof(save.Pub.MISC), L”%s”, x->marshal_as<const wchar_t*>(book->Pub->MISC));
swprintf_s(save.Pub.ShortName, sizeof(save.Pub.ShortName), L”%s”, x->marshal_as<const wchar_t*>(book->Pub->ShortName));
swprintf_s(save.Pub.Author, sizeof(save.Pub.Author), L”%s”, x->marshal_as<const wchar_t*>(book->Pub->Author));
swprintf_s(save.Pub.LongName, sizeof(save.Pub.LongName), L”%s”, x->marshal_as<const wchar_t*>(book->Pub->LongName));
swprintf_s(save.Pub.PathToFile, sizeof(save.Pub.PathToFile), L”%s”, x->marshal_as<const wchar_t*>(book->Pub->PathToFile));
if(book->Priv->PurchaseOrder->Length > 0)
{
pin_ptr<Byte> pin = &book->Priv->PurchaseOrder[0];
save.Priv.PurchaseOrderLength = min(sizeof(save.Priv.PurchaseOrder), book->Priv->PurchaseOrder->Length);
memcpy(save.Priv.PurchaseOrder, pin, save.Priv.PurchaseOrderLength);
pin = nullptr;
}
if(book->Priv->RecieptData->Length > 0)
{
pin_ptr<Byte> pin = &book->Priv->RecieptData[0];
save.Priv.RecieptDataLength = min(sizeof(save.Priv.RecieptData), book->Priv->RecieptData->Length);
memcpy(save.Priv.RecieptData, pin, save.Priv.RecieptDataLength);
pin = nullptr;
}
WriteFile(hFile, &save, sizeof(save), &wrote, NULL);
if(wrote != sizeof(save))
return;
}
CloseHandle(hFile);
hFile = INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE;
}
protected:
// destructor forwards to the disposable interface
virtual __clrcall ~Store()
{
this->!Store();
}
public:
// possibly hide this
void __clrcall Close()
{
_Close();
}
// constructor
__clrcall Store(String^ DataStoreDB)
{
DataStore = DataStoreDB;
LoadDB();
}
// add ebook
void __clrcall Add(ManagedEbook^ eBook)
{
Books->Add(eBook);
}
// remove ebook
void __clrcall Remove(ManagedEbook^ eBook)
{
Books->Remove(eBook);
}
// get query list
List<ManagedEbook^>^ __clrcall Query(ManagedEbook^ eBook)
{
List<ManagedEbook^>^ rv = gcnew List<ManagedEbook^>();
for each(ManagedEbook^ book in Books)
{
if(MatchBook(book, eBook))
rv->Add(book);
}
return rv;
}
};
}
}
Entropy
1. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Entropy_%28information_theory%29
https://fbcdn-sphotos-a.akamaihd.net/hphotos-ak-ash4/398297_10140657048323225_750784224_11609676_1712639207_n.jpg
A while ago, yours truly gave two talks on SSL traffic analysis: one at 44Con and one at RuxCon. A demonstration of the tool was also given at last year’s BlackHat Arsenal by two of my co-workers. The presented research and tool may not have been as groundbreaking as some of the other talks at those conferences, but attendees seemed to like it, so I figured it might make some good blog content.
Traffic analysis is definitely not a new field, neither in general nor when applied to SSL; a lot of great work has been done by reputable research outlets, such as Microsoft Research with researchers like George Danezis. What recent traffic analysis research has tried to show is that there are enormous amounts of useful information to be obtained by an attacker who can monitor the encrypted communication stream.
A great example of this can be found in the paper with the slightly cheesy title Side-Channel Leaks in Web Applications: a Reality Today, a Challenge Tomorrow. The paper discusses some approaches to traffic analysis on SSL-encrypted web applications and applies them to real-world systems. One of the approaches enables an attacker to build a database that contains traffic patterns of the AutoComplete function in drop-down form fields (like Google’s Auto Complete). Another great example is the ability to—for a specific type of stock management web application—reconstruct pie charts in a couple of days and figure out the contents of someone’s stock portfolio.
After discussing these attack types with some of our customers, I noticed that most of them seemed to have some difficulty grasping the potential impact of traffic analysis on their web applications. The research papers I referred them to are quite dry and they’re also written in dense, scientific language that does nothing to ease understanding. So, I decided to just throw some of my dedicated research time out there and come up with a proof of concept tool using a web application that everyone knows and understands: Google Maps.
Since ignorance is bliss, I decided to just jump in and try to build something without even running the numbers on whether it would make any sense to try. I started by running Firefox and Firebug in an effort to make sense of all the JavaScript voodoo going on there. I quickly figured out that Google Maps works by using a grid system in which PNG images (referred to as tiles) are laid out. Latitude and longitude coordinates are converted to x and y values depending on the selected zoom level; this gives a three dimensional coordinate system in which each separate (x, y, z)-triplet represents two PNG images. The first image is called the overlay image and contains the town, river, highway names and so forth; the second image contains the actual satellite data.
Once I had this figured out the approach became simple: scrape a lot of satellite tiles and build a database of the image sizes using the tool GMapCatcher. I then built a tool that uses libpcap to approximate the image sizes by monitoring the SSL encrypted traffic on the wire. The tool tries to match the image sizes to the recorded (x,y,z)-triplets in the database and then tries to cluster the results into a specific region. This is notoriously difficult to do since one gets so many false positives if the database is big enough. Add to this the fact that it is next to impossible to scrape the entire Google Maps database since, first, they will ban you for generating so much traffic and, second, you will have to store many petabytes of image data.
With a little bit of cheating—I used a large browser screen so I would have more data to work with—I managed to make the movie Proof of Concept – SSL Traffic Analysis of Google Maps.
As shown in the movie, the tool has a database that contains city profiles including Paris, Berlin, Amsterdam, Brussels, and Geneva. The tool runs on the right and on the left is the browser accessing Google Maps over SSL. In the first attempt, I load the city of Paris and zoom in a couple of times. On the second attempt I navigate to Berlin and zoom in a few times. On both occasions the tool manages to correctly guess the locations that the browser is accessing.
Please note that it is a shoddy proof of concept, but it shows the concept of SSL traffic analysis pretty well. It also might be easier to understand for less technically inclined people, as in “An attacker can still figure out what you’re looking at on Google Maps” (with the addendum that it’s never going to be a 100% perfect and that my shoddy proof of concept has lots of room for improvement).
For more specific details on this please refer to the IOActive white paper Traffic Analysis on Google Maps with GMaps-Trafficker or send me a tweet at @santaragolabs.
Firmware analysis is a fascinating area within the vast world of reverse engineering, although not very extended. Sometimes you end up in an impasse until noticing a minor (or major) detail you initially overlooked. That’s why sharing methods and findings is a great way to advance into this field.
There are a few things here worth mentioning:
Some months ago at Black Hat USA 2011 I presented this interesting issue in the workshop “Easy and Quick Vulnerability Hunting in Windows,” and now I’m sharing it with all people a more detailed explanation in this blog post.
C:WindowsInstaller
there are many installer files (from already installed applications) with what appear to be random names. When run, some of these installer files (like Microsoft Office Publisher MUI (English) 2007) will automatically elevate privileges and try to install when any Windows user executes them. Since the applications are already installed, there’s no problem, at least in theory.
C:UsersusernameAppDataLocalTemp
, which is the temporary folder for the current user. The created file is named Hx????.tmp
(where ????
seem to be random hex numbers), and it seems to be a COM DLL from Microsoft Help Data Services Module, in which its original name is HXDS.dll
. This DLL is later loaded by msiexec.exe
process running under the System account that is launched by the Windows installer service during the installation process.
msiexec.exe
process generates an MD5 hash of the DLL file and compares it with a known-good MD5 hash value that is read from a file located in C:WindowsInstaller
, which is only readable and writable by System and Administrators accounts.
C:windowstemp
folder, possibly allowing the same attack.
char
string version, respectively. If you’ve done any development on Windows systems, you’ll definitely be no stranger to wide character strings.
int
) from the packet and performs a bounds check. If the check passes, a string of the specified length (assumed to be a UTF-16 string) is copied from the packet buffer to a fresh wide char
array on heap.
[ … ]
if(packet->dataLen > 34 || packet->dataLen < sizeof(wchar_t)) bailout_and_exit();
size_t bufLen = packet->dataLen / sizeof(wchar_t);
wchar_t *appData = new wchar_t[bufLen];
memcpy(appData, packet->payload, packet->dataLen);
[ … ]
char
array. But consider what would happen if packet->dataLen
was an odd number. For example, if packet->dataLen = 11
, we end up with size_t bufLen = 11 / 2 = 5
since the remainder of the division will be discarded.
memcpy()
copies 11 bytes. Since five wide chars on Windows is 10 bytes (and 11 bytes are copied), we have an off-by-one overflow. To avoid this, the modulo operator should be used to check that packet->dataLen
is even to begin with; that is:
if(packet->dataLen % 2) bailout()
len + 1
is used instead of the len + 2
that is required to account for the extra NULL byte(s) needed to terminate wide char
arrays, for example:
int alloc_len = len + 1;
wchar_t *buf = (wchar_t *)malloc(alloc_len);
memset(buf, 0x00, len);
wcsncpy(buf, srcBuf, len);
srcBuf
had len
wide chars in it, all of these would be copied into buf
, but wcsncpy()
would not NULL terminatebuf
. With normal character arrays, the added byte (which will be a NULL because of the memset
) would be the NULL terminator and everything would be fine. But since wide char
strings need either a two- or four-byte NULL terminator (Windows and UNIX, respectively), we now have a non-terminated string that could cause problems later on.
int destLen = (stringLen * (sizeof(wchar_t)) + sizeof(wchar_t);
wchar_t *destBuf = (wchar_t *)malloc(destLen);
MultiByteToWideChar(CP_UTF8, 0, srcBuf, stringLen, destBuf, destLen);
[ do something ]
MultiByteToWide
API is documented at <http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/dd319072%28v=vs.85%29.aspx>.
MultiByteToWideChar
is the length of the destination buffer in wide characters, not in bytes, as the call above was done. Our destination length is out by a factor of two here (or four on UNIX-like systems, generally) and ultimately we can end up overrunning the buffer. These sorts of mistakes result in overflows and they’re surprisingly common.
char
string functions, like wcsncpy()
, for example:unsigned int destLen = (stringLen * sizeof(wchar_t)) + sizeof(wchar_t);
wchar_t destBuf[destLen];
memset(destBuf, 0x00, destLen);
wcsncpy(destBuf, srcBuf, sizeof(destBuf));
sizeof(destuff)
for maximum destination size would be fine if we were dealing with normal characters, this doesn’t work for wide character buffers. Instead, sizeof(destBuf)
will return the number of bytes indestBuf
, which means the wcsncpy()
call above it can end up copying twice as many bytes to destBuf
as intended—again, an overflow.
char
equivalent string manipulation functions are also prone to misuse in the same ways as their normal char
counterparts—look for all the wide char
equivalents when auditing such functions as swprintf
,wcscpy
, wcsncpy
, etc. There also are a few wide char
-specific APIs that are easily misused; take, for example,wcstombs()
, which
converts a wide char
string to a multi-byte string. The prototype looks like this:size_t wcstombs(char *restrict s, const wchar_t *restrict pwcs, size_t n);
n
bytes have been written to s
or when a NULL terminator is encountered in pwcs
(the source buffer). If an error occurs, i.e. a wide char
in pwcs
can’t be converted, the conversion stops and the function returns (size_t)-1
, else the number of bytes written is returned. The MSDN considerswcstombs()
to be deprecated, but there are still a few common ways to mess when using it, and they all revolve around not checking return values.
int i;
i = wcstombs( … ) // wcstombs() can return -1
buf[i] = L'';
n
, the destination buffer won’t be NULL terminated, so any string operations later carried out on or using the destination buffer could run past the end of the buffer. Two possible consequences are a potential page fault if an operation runs off the end of a page or potential memory corruption bugs, depending on howdestbuf
is usedlater . Developers should avoid wcstombs()
and use wcstombs_s()
or another, safer alternative. Bottom line: always read the docs before using a new function since APIs don’t always do what you’d expect (or want) them to do.
char
and normal char
functions. A good example would be incorrectly using strlen()
on a wide character string instead of wcslen()
—since wchar
strings are chock full of NULL bytes, strlen()
isn’t going to return the length you were after. It’s easy to see how this can end up causing security problems if a memory allocation is done based on a strlen()
that was incorrectly performed on a wide char array.
wchar
s. In the examples above, I have assumed sizeof(wchar_t) = 2
; however, as I’ve said a few times, this is NOT necessarily the case at all, since many UNIX-like systems have sizeof(wchar_t) = 4
.
wchar_t *destBuf = (wchar_t *)malloc(32 * 2 + 2);
wcsncpy(destBuf, srcBuf, 32);
destBuff
for 32 wide char
s + NULL terminator (66 bytes). But as soon as you run this on a Linux box—where wide char
s are four bytes—you’re going to get wcsncpy()
writing 4 * 32 + 2 = 130
bytes and resulting in a pretty obvious overflow.
sizeof(wchar_t)
to find out.
char
functions, and ensure the math is right when allocating and copying memory. Make sure you check your return values properly and, most obviously, read the docs to make absolutely sure you’re not making any mistakes or missing something important.
Needs or Likes Templates:
Once we have a target list (emails, names, etc.) and a ruse, we need to begin gathering information about the internal network and infrastructure from within. One possible way of doing this is by sending one or more rounds of emails using specially crafted html templates consisting of several image tags pointing to different ports, as it is shown on the figure below.
Once we have a list of ports we want to scan from an internal perspective, we do not need to generate the entire list. EMaily will automatically generate the list and populated with the corresponding email using the template system as it is shown on the following code snippet, by simply using the %%payload[port 1, … ,port n]%%
You may ask, “but what is to gain from generating this random set of images?” The short answer is lots of information. We will not only be able to confirm that the firewall in the company we are trying to attack is not properly filtering the particular port, but also whenever an application makes an HTTP request, it sends lots of useful information back to the attacker.
This is part three of a four-part social engineering post. The next and final entry will discuss compromising machines.
Search Engines
– Google
– Bing
– Yahoo
– AltaVista
|
Social Engines
– LinkedIn
– Google Profiles
– Naymz
– Classmates
– Spoke
– Google+
|
Other Engines
– PGP servers
– Usenets
– GoogleGroups Search
– Spider
– LDAP
|
PDF
DOC
DOCX
|
ODP
ODS
ODB
|
XLSX
PPTX
TXT
|
ODT
ASN
|
esearchy
.
esearchy
CLI command and/or by creating custom scripts using the ESearchy library—that is, they requireesearchy
.
help
command in the ESearchy tool itself, which is:esearchy –h