From the beginning, bad actors have also joined Wall Street’s party, developing clever models for fraudulent gains. Their efforts have included everything from fictitious brokerage firms that ended up being Ponzi schemes to organized cells performing Pump-and-Dump scams. (Pump: buy cheap shares and inflate the price through sketchy financials and misleading statements to the marketplace through spam, social media and other technological means; Dump: once the price is high, sell the shares and collect a profit).
When it comes to security, it’s worth noting how banking systems are organized when compared to global exchange markets. In banking systems, the information is centralized into one single financial entity; there is one point of failure rather than many, which make them more vulnerable to cyberattacks. In contrast, global exchange markets are distributed; records of who owns what, who sold/bought what, and to whom, are not stored in a single place, but many. Like matter and energy, stocks and other securities cannot be created from the void (e.g. a modified database record within a financial entity). Once issued, they can only be exchanged from one entity to another. That said, the valuable information as well as the attack surface and vectors in trading environments are slightly different than those in banking systems.
Over the years I’ve used the desktop and web platforms offered by banks in my country with limited visibility of available trade instruments. Today, accessing global capital markets is as easy as opening a Facebook account through online brokerage firms. This is how I gained access to a wider financial market, including US-listed companies. Anyone can buy and sell a wide range of financial instruments on the secondary market (e.g. stocks, ETFs, etc.), derivatives market (e.g. options, binary options, contracts for difference, etc.), forex markets, or the avant-garde cryptocurrency markets.
Most banks with investment solutions and the aforementioned brokerage houses offer mobile platforms to operate in the market. These apps allow you to do things including, but not limited to:
- Fund your account via bank transfers or credit card
- Keep track of your available equity and buying power (cash and margin balances)
- Monitor your positions (securities you own) and their performance (profit)
- Monitor instruments or indexes
- Give buy/sell orders
- Create alerts or triggers to be executed when certain thresholds are reached
- Receive real-time news or video broadcasts
- Stay in touch with the trading community through social media and chats
Needless to say, whether you’re a speculator, a very active intra-day trader, or simply someone who likes to follow long-term buy-and-hold strategies, every single item on the previous list must be kept secret and only known by and shown to its owner.
Four months ago, while using my trading app, I asked myself, “with the huge amount of money transacted in the money market, how secure are these mobile apps?” So, there I was, one minute later, starting this research to expose cybersecurity and privacy weaknesses in some of these apps.
Before I pass along my results, I’d like to share the interesting and controversial moral of the story: The app developed by a brokerage firm who suffered a data breach many years ago was shown to be the most secure one.
My analysis encompassed the latest version of 21 of the most used and well-known mobile trading apps available on the Apple Store and Google Play. Testing focused only on the mobile apps; desktop and web platforms were not tested. While I discovered some security vulnerabilities in the backend servers, I did not include them in this article.
- iOS 10.3.3 (iPhone 6) [not jailbroken]
- Android 7.1.1 (Emulator) [rooted]
I tested the following 14 security controls, which represent just the tip of the iceberg when compared to an exhaustive list of security checks for mobile apps. This may give you a better picture of the current state of these apps’ security. It’s worth noting that I could not test all of the controls in some of the apps either because a feature was not implemented (e.g. social chats) or it was not technically feasible (e.g. SSL pinning that wouldn’t allow data manipulation), or simply because I could not open an account.
Unfortunately, the results proved to be much worse than those for personal banking apps in 2013 and 2015.  Cybersecurity has not been on the radar of the FinTech space in charge of developing trading apps. Security researchers have disregarded these apps as well, probably because of a lack of understanding of money markets.
The issues I found in the tested controls are grouped in the following sections. Logos and technical details that mention the name of brokerage institutions were removed from the screenshots, logs, and reverse engineered code to prevent any negative impacts to their customers or reputation.
Cleartext Passwords Exposed
In four apps (19%), the user’s password was sent in cleartext either to an unencrypted XML configuration file or to the logging console. Physical access to the device is required to extract them, though.
In a hypothetical attack scenario, a malicious user could extract a password from the file system or the logging functionality without any in-deptfh know-how (it’s relatively easily), log in through any other trading platform from the brokerage firm, and perform unauthorized actions. They could sell stocks, transfer the money to a newly added bank account, and delete this bank account after the transfer is complete. During testing, I noticed that most of the apps require only the current password to link banking accounts and do not have two-factor authentication (2FA) implemented, therefore, no authorization one-time-password (OTP) is sent to the user’s phone or email.
Trading and Account Information Exposed
In the trading context, operational or strategic data must not be sent unencrypted to the logging console nor any log file. This sensitive data encompasses values such as personal data, general balances, cash balance, margin balance, net worth, net liquidity, the number of positions, recently quoted symbols, watchlists, buy/sell orders, alerts, equity, buying power, and deposits. Additionally, sensitive technical values such as username, password, session ID, URLs, and cryptographic tokens should not be exposed either.
62% of the apps sent sensitive data to log files, and 67% stored it unencrypted. Physical access to the device is required to extract this data.
If these values are somehow leaked, a malicious user could gain insight into users’ net worth and investing strategy by knowing which instruments users have been looking for recently, as well as their balances, positions, watchlists, buying power, etc.
Imagine a hypothetical scenario where a high-profile, sophisticated investor loses his phone and the trading app he has been using stores his “Potential Investments” watchlist in cleartext. If the extracted watchlist ends up in the hands of someone who wants to mimic this investor’s strategy, they could buy stocks prior to a price increase. In the worst case, imagine a “Net Worth” figure landing in the wrong hands, say kidnappers, who now know how generous ransom could be.
Balances and investment portfolio leaked in logs:
Two apps use unencrypted HTTP channels to transmit and receive all data, and 13 of 19 apps that use HTTPS do not check the authenticity of the remote endpoint by verifying its SSL certificate (SSL pinning); therefore, it’s feasible to perform Man-in-the-Middle (MiTM) attacks to eavesdrop on and tamper with data. Some MiTM attacks require to trick the user into installing a malicious certificate on the mobile device.
Under certain circumstances, an attacker with access to some part of the network, such as the router in a public Wi-Fi, could see and modify information transmitted to and from the mobile app. In the trading context, a malicious actor could intercept and alter values, such as the bid or ask prices of an instrument, and cause a user to buy or sell securities based on misleading information.
For instance, the following app uses an insecure channel for communication by default; an inexperienced user who does not know the meaning of “SSL” (Secure Socket Layer) won’t enable it on the login screen and all sensitive data will be sent and received in cleartext, without encryption:
One single app was found to send a log file with sensitive trading data to the server on a scheduled basis over an unencrypted HTTP channel.
Some apps transmit non-sensitive data (e.g. public news or live financial TV broadcastings) through insecure channels, which does not seem to represent a risk to the user.
Authentication and Session Management
Nowadays, most modern smartphones support fingerprint-reading, and most trading apps use it to authenticate their customers. Only five apps (24%) do not implement this feature.
Unfortunately, using the fingerprint database in the phone has a downside:
One single trading app (look for “the moral of the story” earlier in this article) supports “Privacy Mode,” which protects the customers’ private information displayed on the screen in public areas where shoulder-surfing attacks are feasible. The rest of the apps do not implement this useful and important feature.
However, there’s a small bug in this unique implementation: every sensitive figure is masked except in the “Positions” tab where the “Net Liquidity” column and the “Overall Totals” are fully visible:
Client-side Data Validation
XSS triggered in two different apps (<script>alert(document.cookie);</script>):
Many Android apps do not run on rooted devices for security reasons. On a rooted phone or emulator, the user has full control of the system, thus, access to files, databases, and logs is complete. Once a user has full access to these elements, it’s easy to extract valuable information.
20 of the apps (95%) do not detect rooted environments. The single app (look for “the moral of the story” earlier in this article) that does detect it simply shows a warning message; it allows the user to keep using the platform normally:
Hardcoded Secrets in Code and App Obfuscation
Six Android app installers (.apk files) were easily reverse engineered to human-readable code. The rest had medium to high levels of obfuscation, as the one shown below. The goal of obfuscation is to conceal the applications purpose (security through obscurity) and logic in order to deter reverse engineering and to make it more difficult.
The following trust issue grabbed my attention: a URL with my username (email) and first name passed as parameters was leaked to the logging console. This URL is opened to talk with, apparently, a chatbot inside the mobile app, but if you grab this URL and open it in a common web browser, the chatbot takes your identity from the supplied parameters and trusts you as a logged in user. From there, you can ask details about your account. As you can see, all you need to retrieve someone else’s private data is to know his/her email only and his/her name:
I haven’t had enough time to fully test this feature, but so far, I was able to extract balances and personal information.
Since a picture is worth a thousand words, consider the following graphs:
One of IOActive’s missions is to act responsibly when it comes to vulnerability disclosure, thus, between September 6th and 8th, we sent a detailed report to 13 of the brokerage firms whose trading apps presented some of the higher risks vulnerabilities discussed in this article.
To the date, only two brokerage firms replied our email.
Regulators and Rating Organizations
Digging in some US regulators’ websites,   I noticed that they are already aware of the cybersecurity threats that might negatively impact financial markets and stakeholders. Most of the published content focuses on general threats that could impact end-users or institutions such as phishing, identity theft, antivirus software, social media risks, privacy, and procedures to follow in case of cybersecurity incidents, such as data breaches or disruptive attacks.
Nevertheless, I did not find any documentation related to the security risks of electronic trading nor any recommended guidance for secure software development to educate brokers and FinTech companies on how to create quality products.
In addition, there are rating organizations that score online brokers on a scale of 1 to 5 stars. I glimpsed at two recent reports   and didn’t find anything related to security or privacy in their reviews. Nowadays, with the frequent cyberattacks in the financial industry, I think these organizations should give accolades or at least mention the security mechanisms the evaluated trading platforms implement in their reviews. Security controls should equal a competitive advantage.
Conclusions and Recommendations
- There’s still a long way to go to improve the maturity level of security in mobile trading apps.
- Desktop and web platforms should also be tested and improved.
- Regulators should encourage brokers to implement safeguards for a better trading environment.
- In addition to the generic IT best practices for secure software development, regulators should develop trading-specific guidelines to be followed by the brokerage firms and FinTech companies in charge of creating trading software.
- Brokerage firms should perform regular internal audits to continuously improve the security posture of their trading platforms.
- Developers should analyze their apps to determine if they suffer from the vulnerabilities I have described in this post, and if so, fix them.
- Developers should design new, more secure financial software following secure coding practices.
- End users should enable all of the security mechanisms their apps offer.
Remember: the stock market is not a casino where you magically get rich overnight. If you lack an understanding of how stocks or other financial instruments work, there is a high risk of losing money quickly. You must understand the market and its purpose before investing.
With nothing left to say, I wish you happy and secure trading!