


Beyond The 'Cript: Practical iOS Reverse Engineering

Michael Allen (@_dark_knight_)
Security Consultant

Identifying and bypassing Simple Jailbreak Detection Routines Case Study



Case Study: Viewing File System Activity

- Using filemon -l
- Creates hard links to temporary files

```
Auto-linked /private/var/mobile/Containers/Data/Application/CB61B9D0-3C4D-4643-B499-443D3666A0E9/Library/Caches/Snapshots/de.sektioneins.sysinfo/251357E1-92A5-4D5F-82F1-B2ACAFD53527@2x.png to /private/var/tmp/filemon/251357E1-92A5-4D5F-82F1-B2ACAFD53527@2x.png.filemon.15
92 SpringBoard Created /private/var/mobile/Containers/Data/Application/CB61B9D0-3C4D-4643-B499-443D3666A0E9/Library/Caches/Snapshots/de.sektioneins.sysinfo/251357E1-92A5-4D5F-82F1-B2ACAFD53527@2x.png
92 SpringBoard Modified /private/var/mobile/Containers/Data/Application/CB61B9D0-3C4D-4643-B499-443D3666A0E9/Library/Caches/Snapshots/de.sektioneins.sysinfo/251357E1-92A5-4D5F-82F1-B2ACAFD53527@2x.png
92 SpringBoard Deleted /private/var/mobile/Containers/Data/Application/CB61B9D0-3C4D-4643-B499-443D3666A0E9/Library/Caches/Snapshots/de.sektioneins.sysinfo/E9396C40-CF92-48DE-8834-13BDB25819A3@2x.png
92 SpringBoard Deleted /private/var/mobile/Containers/Data/Application/CB61B9D0-3C4D-4643-B499-443D3666A0E9/Library/Caches/Snapshots/de.sektioneins.sysinfo/downscaled/CDA55A72-AF2A-4C4B-B72B-4F36B664FADE@2x.png
Auto-linked /private/var/mobile/Containers/Data/Application/CB61B9D0-3C4D-4643-B499-443D3666A0E9/Library/Caches/Snapshots/de.sektioneins.sysinfo/downscaled/1422BF63-E775-4BB6-B662-BD193F4CF1F0@2x.png to /private/var/tmp/filemon/1422BF63-E775-4BB6-B662-BD193F4CF1F0@2x.png.filemon.16
```


Case Study: Viewing Logs

- Using idevicesyslog [libimobiledevice]

```
Oct 24 12:37:19 Neo SysSecInfo[1183] <Warning>: Get fact for de.sektion.eins.artefact.fileDoesNotExist.:/panguaxe.installed
Oct 24 12:37:33 Neo SysSecInfo[1183] <Warning>: Get fact for de.sektion.eins.artefact.fileDoesNotExist.:/xuan.yuan.sword.installed
Oct 24 12:37:33 Neo SysSecInfo[1183] <Warning>: Get fact for de.sektion.eins.artefact.fileDoesNotExist.:/System/Library/LaunchDaemons/io.pangu.axe.untether.plist
Oct 24 12:37:33 Neo SysSecInfo[1183] <Warning>: Get fact for de.sektion.eins.artefact.fileDoesNotExist.:/panguaxe.installed
Oct 24 12:37:34 Neo SysSecInfo[1183] <Warning>: Get fact for de.sektion.eins.artefact.fileDoesNotExist.:/System/Library/Caches/com.apple.dyld/enable-dylibs-to-override-cache
Oct 24 12:37:34 Neo SysSecInfo[1183] <Warning>: Get fact for de.sektion.eins.artefact.fileDoesNotExist.:/System/Library/LaunchDaemons/com.evad3rs.evasi0n7.untether.plist
Oct 24 12:37:34 Neo SysSecInfo[1183] <Warning>: Get fact for de.sektion.eins.artefact.fileDoesNotExist.:/bin/bash
Oct 24 12:37:34 Neo SysSecInfo[1183] <Warning>: Get fact for de.sektion.eins.artefact.fileDoesNotExist.:/bin/sh
Oct 24 12:37:35 Neo SysSecInfo[1183] <Warning>: Get fact for de.sektion.eins.artefact.fileDoesNotExist.:/Applications/Cydia.app/Cydia
Oct 24 12:37:35 Neo SysSecInfo[1183] <Warning>: Get fact for de.sektion.eins.artefact.fileDoesNotExist.:/usr/sbin/sshd
Oct 24 12:37:36 Neo SysSecInfo[1183] <Warning>: BootArgs: cs_enforcement_disable=1
Oct 24 12:37:38 Neo SysSecInfo[1183] <Warning>: BAD: BootArg "cs_enforcement_disable" is set.
Oct 24 12:37:41 Neo kernel[0] <Notice>: Sandbox: SysSecInfo(1183) deny(1) process-fork
Oct 24 12:37:41 Neo SysSecInfo[1183] <Warning>: DATAFS allows suid and dev files
Oct 24 12:37:41 Neo SysSecInfo[1183] <Warning>: ROOTFS is read-write mounted
Oct 24 12:37:41 Neo SysSecInfo[1183] <Warning>: Testing tfp0
Oct 24 12:37:42 Neo SysSecInfo[1183] <Warning>: task_for_pid0 scheint nicht gepatcht
```

Case Study: Obtaining The Binary

- Dump the binary (facilitated by DYLD and DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES environment variable)

```
root@Neo (/var/root)# DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES=dumpdecrypted.dylib /var/mobile/Containers/Bundle/Application/25A72B67-9342-471F-ADF9-FC80C5F21B22/SysSecInfo.app/SysSecInfo mach-o decryption dumper
```

DISCLAIMER: This tool is only meant for security research purposes, not for application crackers.

```
[+] detected 64bit ARM binary in memory.
[+] offset to cryptid found: @0x1000b0ac8(from 0x1000b0000) = ac8
[+] Found encrypted data at address 00004000 of length 770048 bytes - type 1.
[+] Opening /private/var/mobile/Containers/Bundle/Application/25A72B67-9342-471F-ADF9-FC80C5F21B22/SysSecInfo.app/SysSecInfo for reading.
[+] Reading header
[+] Detecting header type
[+] Executable is a FAT image - searching for right architecture
[+] Correct arch is at offset 835584 in the file
[+] Opening SysSecInfo.decrypted for writing.
[+] Copying the not encrypted start of the file
[+] Dumping the decrypted data into the file
[+] Copying the not encrypted remainder of the file
[+] Setting the LC_ENCRYPTION_INFO->cryptid to 0 at offset ccac8
[+] Closing original file
[+] Closing dump file _
```

Case Study: Obtaining Symbols

- Dump the symbols along with dylib's to which they belong

```
DarkKnight:Cript michael$ jtool -v -S SysSecInfo-arm64
0xf6338 0000000100000000 T __mh_execute_header
0xf6348 U _CFStringGetCStringPtr: /System/Library/Frameworks/CoreFoundation.framework/CoreFoundation
0xf6358 U _NSLog: /System/Library/Frameworks/Foundation.framework/Foundation
0xf6368 U _NSSearchPathForDirectoriesInDomains: /System/Library/Frameworks/Foundation.framework/Foundation
0xf6378 U _NSStringFromClass: /System/Library/Frameworks/Foundation.framework/Foundation
0xf6388 U _OBJC_CLASS_$_NSArray: /System/Library/Frameworks/CoreFoundation.framework/CoreFoundation
0xf6398 U _OBJC_CLASS_$_NSBundle: /System/Library/Frameworks/Foundation.framework/Foundation
0xf63a8 U _OBJC_CLASS_$_NSData: /System/Library/Frameworks/CoreFoundation.framework/CoreFoundation
0xf63b8 U _OBJC_CLASS_$_NSDate: /System/Library/Frameworks/CoreFoundation.framework/CoreFoundation
0xf63c8 U _OBJC_CLASS_$_NSDateFormatter: /System/Library/Frameworks/Foundation.framework/Foundation
0xf63d8 U _OBJC_CLASS_$_NSDictionary: /System/Library/Frameworks/CoreFoundation.framework/CoreFoundation
0xf63e8 U _OBJC_CLASS_$_NSLocale: /System/Library/Frameworks/CoreFoundation.framework/CoreFoundation
0xf63f8 U _OBJC_CLASS_$_NSLock: /System/Library/Frameworks/Foundation.framework/Foundation
0xf6408 U _OBJC_CLASS_$_NSMutableArray: /System/Library/Frameworks/CoreFoundation.framework/CoreFoundation
0xf6418 U _OBJC_CLASS_$_NSMutableDictionary: /System/Library/Frameworks/Foundation.framework/Foundation
0xf6428 U _OBJC_CLASS_$_NotificationCenter: /System/Library/Frameworks/Foundation.framework/Foundation
0xf6438 U _OBJC_CLASS_$_NSNumber: /System/Library/Frameworks/Foundation.framework/Foundation
0xf6448 U _OBJC_CLASS_$_NSObject: /usr/lib/libobjc.A.dylib
0xf6458 U _OBJC_CLASS_$_NSPredicate: /System/Library/Frameworks/Foundation.framework/Foundation
0xf6468 U _OBJC_CLASS_$_NSProcessInfo: /System/Library/Frameworks/Foundation.framework/Foundation
```

Case Study: Extracting strings

- Any interesting strings?
- Dump **cstring** section (same as running strings)
 - Knowledge of SEGMENTS and sections important

```
DarkKnight:Cript michael$ jtool -d __TEXT.__cstring SysSecInfo-arm64

Dumping C-Strings from address 0x100092cad (Segment: __TEXT.__cstring)..
Address : 0x100092cad = Offset 0x92cad
0x100092cad: de.sektioneins.artefact.symlinksApplication
0x100092cd9: /Application is a Symlink
0x100092cf3: /Application is no Symlink
0x100092d0e: /Applications
0x100092d1c: Error - Cannot access /Applications\r
0x100092d41: hash
0x100092d46: TQ,R
0x100092d4b: superclass
0x100092d56: T#,R
0x100092d5b: description
0x100092d67: T@"NSString",R,C
0x100092d78: debugDescription
0x100092d89: de.sektioneins.infoItem.ProcessList
0x100092dad: Processes
0x100092db7: (len not supplied?)
0x100092db8: ProcessList
0x100092dc4: ProcessListSegue
0x100092dd5: type
0x100092dda: T@"NSNumber",&,Vtype
0x100092def: v8@?0
```


Case Study: Extracting DYLIB'S

- procexp <pid> regions

```
MALLOC_LARGE metadata 0x595af457 000000001002e000-000000001002d4000 [ 32K]rw-/rwx PRV
(0) 0x5939c6bf 000000001002d4000-000000001002d8000 [ 16K]r-x/rwx COW /Library/Frameworks/CydiaSubstrate.framework/Libra
ries/SubstrateBootstrap.dylib
(0) 0x5939c6bf 000000001002d8000-000000001002dc000 [ 16K]rw-/rwx COW /Library/Frameworks/CydiaSubstrate.framework/Libra
ries/SubstrateBootstrap.dylib
(0) 0x5939c6bf 000000001002dc000-000000001002e000 [ 16K]r--/rwx COW /Library/Frameworks/CydiaSubstrate.framework/Libra
ries/SubstrateBootstrap.dylib
MALLOC guard page 0x00000000 000000001002e000-000000001002e4000 [ 16K]---/rwx NUL
MALLOC metadata 0x5a8b1ff7 000000001002e4000-000000001002fc000 [ 96K]rw-/rwx PRV
MALLOC guard page 0x00000000 000000001002fc000-00000000100300000 [ 16K]---/rwx NUL
MALLOC guard page 0x00000000 00000000100300000-00000000100304000 [ 16K]---/rwx NUL
MALLOC metadata 0x5a8b1ff7 00000000100304000-00000000100308000 [ 16K]---/rwx PRV
```

Dump the library with lldb

```
0x199430d4c 0x199430d4c
(lldb) me r -o /tmp/tmpFile -b --force 0x000000001002d4000 0x000000001002d8000
16384 bytes written to '/tmp/tmpFile'
(lldb)
```


Case Study: Extracting DYLIB'S

```
DarkKnight:tmp michael$ file tmpFile
tmpFile: Mach-O 64-bit dynamically linked shared library
DarkKnight:tmp michael$ jtool -d tmpFile
```

Warning: companion file ./tmpFile.ARM64.3134CFB2-F722-310E-A2C7-42AE4DC131AB not found


Disassembling from file offset 0x3da8, Address 0x3da8

```
3da8 STP X29, X30, [SP, #-16]! ;
3dac ADD X29, SP, #0 X29 = 0x3db0 -|
3db0 ADR X0, #248 "MSExitZero" ; ->R0 = 0x3ea8
3db4 NOP ;
3db8 BL 0x3e54 ;
; // if (0x.. != 0) then goto 0x3e04
3dbc CBNZ X0, 0x3e04 ;
3dc0 ADR X0, #305 "/System/Library/Frameworks/Security.framework/Security"
; ->R0 = 0x3ef1
3dc4 NOP ;
3dc8 MOVZ W1, 0x11 ; ->R1 = 0x11
3dcc BL 0x3e48 ;
; // if (0x.. == 0) then goto 0x3dfc
3dd0 CBZ X0, 0x3dfc ;
3dd4 BL 0x3e3c ;
3dd8 ADR X0, #336 "/System/Library/Frameworks/CoreFoundation.framework/Core
Foundation" ; ->R0 = 0x3f28
3ddc NOP ;
3de0 MOVZ W1, 0x9 ; ->R1 = 0x9
```

Case Study: Obtaining Classes

```
DarkKnight:Cript michael$ jtool -v -d objc SysSecInfo-arm64
Warning: companion file ./SysSecInfo-arm64.ARM64.8DBD392A-5FA8-3710-9E93-CB78D4BAF640 not found
// Dumping class 0 (ApplicationSymlinkArtefact)
@interface ApplicationSymlinkArtefact : Artefact
// 4 properties:
@property (readonly) unsigned long long hash;
@property (readonly) Class superclass;
@property (readonly,copy) NSString description;
@property (readonly,copy) NSString debugDescription;
// 1 class methods
/* 0 */ 0x100005c0c - load; // Protocol 1186a73f2
// 5 instance methods
/* 0 */ 0x100005c60 - uuid; // Protocol @16@0:8
/* 1 */ 0x100005c8c - titleFactFailed; // Protocol @16@0:8
/* 2 */ 0x100005cb8 - titleFactPassed; // Protocol @16@0:8
/* 3 */ 0x100005ce4 - getFact; // Protocol B16@0:8
/* 4 */ 0x100005d44 - orderNr; // Protocol @16@0:8
@end
// Dumping class 1 (ProcessListInfoItem)
@interface ProcessListInfoItem : InfoItem
// 4 properties:
@property (readonly) unsigned long long hash;
@property (readonly) Class superclass;
@property (readonly,copy) NSString description;
@property (readonly,copy) NSString debugDescription;
```

Case Study: Bypassing RootFS Check



Case Study: Bypassing RootFS Check

-[RootFSMountOptionArtefacts getFact]:

```
10000698c STP    X20, X19, [SP, #-32]! ;
100006990 STP    X29, X30, [SP, #16] ;
100006994 ADD    X29, SP, #16 ; $$ R29 = SP + 0x10
100006998 SUB    SP, SP, 2176 ; SP -= 0x880 (stack frame)
10000699c NOP ;
1000069a0 LDR    X19, #759416 ; X19 = *(1000c0018) = -libSystem.B.dylib::__stack_chk_guard-
1000069a4 LDR    X19, [X19, #0] ; R19 = *(libSystem.B.dylib::__stack_chk_guard)
1000069a8 STUR   X19, X29, #-24 ;= X19 0x0
1000069ac ADD    X0, SP, #0 ; $$ R0 = SP + 0x0
1000069b0 MOVZ   W1, 0x878 ; -->R1 = 0x878
1000069b4 BL     libSystem.B.dylib::_bzero ; 0x10009050c
; R0 = libSystem.B.dylib::_bzero(SP + 0x0, 2168);
1000069b8 ADR    X0, #575060 ; -->R0 = 0x10009300c ← statfs argument
1000069bc NOP ;
1000069c0 ADD    X1, SP, #0 ; $$ R1 = SP + 0x0
1000069c4 BL     libSystem.B.dylib::_statfs ; 0x10009077c ← statfs func call
; // if (libSystem.B.dylib::_statfs == 0) then goto 0x1000069d8
1000069c8 CBZ    X0, 0x1000069d8 ;
1000069cc ADR    X0, #841148 @"ERROR BAD ERROR BAD - maybe we need another symbol for UNEXPI
E OF TESTCASE" ; -->R0 = 0x1000d3f88
1000069d0 NOP ;
1000069d4 B      0x1000069e8 ;
1000069d8 LDRB   W8, [SP, #64] ; --R8 = *(SP + 64) = 0x0 ... (null)?..
; // if (R8 != 0) then goto 0x1000069f4
1000069dc TBNZ   W8, #0, 0x1000069f4 ; ← Patch here
1000069e0 ADR    X0, #841096 @"R00TFS is read-write mounted" ; -->R0 = 0x1000d3f68
1000069e4 NOP ;
```


Case Study: Bypassing RootFS Check

- Patch register w8


```
SysSecInfo`__lldb_unnamed_function59$$SysSecInfo:  
-> 0x1000269dc <+80>: tbnz    w8, #0, 0x1000269f4  
    0x1000269e0 <+84>: adr     x0, #841096  
    0x1000269e4 <+88>: nop  
    0x1000269e8 <+92>: bl      0x1000b0284
```

```
(lldb) reg read w8  
      w8 = 0x00000000  
(lldb) reg write w8 1  
(lldb) c
```


```
    ; <+104> ← Patch here  
    ; @"R00TFS is read-write mounted"  
    ; symbol stub for: NSLog
```

```
; Foundation::_NSLog(@"R00TFS is read-write mounted");  
1000069ec    MOVZ    W0, 0x0                ; ->R0 = 0x0  
1000069f0    B        0x100006a04  
1000069f4    ADR      X0, #841044          @"R00TFS is read-only mounted"  
1000069f8    NOP  
1000069fc    BL       Foundation::_NSLog    ; 0x100090284
```


Case Study: Bypassing RootFS Check



Case Study: Bypassing Debugger Checks



Changes when
debugger attached



Case Study: Bypassing Debugger Checks (ppid)

```
-[DebugPPIDArtefact getFact]:
1000150d4 STP X24, X23, [SP,#-64]! ;
1000150d8 STP X22, X21, [SP,#16] ;
1000150dc STP X20, X19, [SP,#32] ;
1000150e0 STP X29, X30, [SP,#48] ;
1000150e4 ADD X29, SP, #48 ; $$ R29 = SP + 0x30
1000150e8 SUB SP, SP, 688 ; SP -= 0x2b0 (stack frame)
1000150ec MOV X19, X0 ; --X19 = X0 = ARG0
1000150f0 NOP ;
1000150f4 LDR X22, #700196 ; X22 = *(1000c0018) = -libSystem.B.dylib:___stack_chk_guard-
1000150f8 LDR X22, [X22, #0] ; R22 = *(libSystem.B.dylib:___stack_chk_guard)
1000150fc STUR X22, X29, #-56 ;= X22 0x0
100015100 NOP ;
100015104 LDRSW X23, 1000df798

100015108 -LDR X0, [X19, X23 ...] ; R0 = *(ARG0)
10001510c STR X31, [X19, xX23] .. ; R31 = *(ARG0)= 0x0
100015110 BL libobjc.A.dylib:___objc_release ; 0x1000903c8
100015114 BL libSystem.B.dylib:___getppid ; 0x100090614
100015118 CMP W0, #1 ;
10001511c B.EQ 0x100015174 ;
100015120 -LDR X20, [X19, X23 ...] ; -R0 = *(R0 + 0) = .. *(0x0, no sym) = 0x10000cfeedfac
; (null)?..
; // if (R20 == 0) then goto 0x100015158
100015124 CBZ X20, 0x100015158 ;
100015128 NOP ;
10001512c LDR X1, #827980 ; X1 = *(1000df378) = -stringByAppendingString:-
100015130 ADR X2, #794072 @"", ppid" ; ->R2 = 0x1000d6f08
100015134 NOP ;
100015138 MOV X0, X20 ; --X0 = X20 = 0x0
10001513c BL libobjc.A.dylib:___objc_msgSend ; 0x1000903a4
; [? stringByAppendingString:@"", ppid"]
100015140 MOV X29, X29 ; --X29 = X29 = 0x60
```


Case Study: Bypassing Debugger Checks (ppid)

```
;  
100015108 -LDR X0, [X19, X23 ...] ;  
10001510c STR X31, [X19, xX23] .. ;  
100015110 BL libobjc.A.dylib::_objc_release ;  
100015114 BL libSystem.B.dylib::_getppid ;  
100015118 CMP W0, #1 ;  
10001511c B.EQ 0x100015174 ;
```

Patch here

```
R0 = *(ARG0)  
R31 = *(ARG0) = 0x0  
; 0x1000903c8  
; 0x100090614
```

ppid func call

Case Study: Bypassing Debugger Checks (ppid)

```
SysSecInfo`__lldb_unnamed_function353$$SysSecInfo:
-> 0x100059118 <+68>: cmp      w0, #1      ← Patch here
    0x10005911c <+72>: b.eq     0x100059174
    0x100059120 <+76>: ldr      x20, [x19, x23]
    0x100059124 <+80>: cbz      x20, 0x100059158

(lldb) reg read w0
w0 = 0x0000072a
(lldb) reg write w0 1
(lldb) c
```

- parent process id of calling process

```
root@Neo (/var/root)# ps aux | grep 1834
root      1834   0.0  0.3  687360  2652 s000  S+   6:42PM   0:00.46 debugserver -x backboard *:4444
/var/mobile/Containers/Bundle/Application/25A72B67-9342-471F-ADF9-FC80C5F21B22/SysSecInfo.app/SysSecI
nfo
```

Case Study: Bypassing Debugger Checks (p_traced)

```
100015194 ORR    W8, WZR, #0x1          ; ->R8 = 0x1
100015198 STUR   X8, X29, #-64        ;= X8 0x1
10001519c BL     libSystem.B.dylib::_getpid ; 0x100090608
1000151a0 STUR   X0, X29, #-60        ;= X0 0x0
1000151a4 SUB    X0, X29, #72         X0 = 0x18 -|
1000151a8 ORR    W1, WZR, #0x4          ; ->R1 = 0x4
1000151ac ADD    X2, SP, #16          X2 = 0x1000151c0 -|
1000151b0 ADD    X3, SP, #8          X3 = 0x1000151bc -|
1000151b4 MOVZ   X4, 0x0             ; ->R4 = 0x0
1000151b8 MOVZ   X5, 0x0             ; ->R5 = 0x0
1000151bc BL     libSystem.B.dylib::_sysctl ; 0x100090818
; // if (libSystem.B.dylib::_sysctl != 0) then goto 0x100015220
1000151c0 CBNZ   X0, 0x100015220      ;
1000151c4 LDRB   W8, [SP, #49]       ; -R8 = *(R31 + 49) = .. *(0x1000151f9, no sym) = 0x0 ... ?..
; // if (R8 == 3) then goto 0x100015220
1000151c8 TBZ    W8, #3, 0x100015220 ;
1000151cc -LDR   X20, [X19, X23 ...]      ; -R0 = *(R0 + 0) = .. *(0x0, no sym) = 0x100000cfeed1
. (null)?..
; // if (R20 == 0) then goto 0x100015204
1000151d0 CBZ    X20, 0x100015204 ;
1000151d4 NOP
1000151d8 LDR    X1, #827808          ; X1 = *(1000df378) = -stringByAppendingString:-
1000151dc ADR    X2, #793964        @"", p_traced" ; ->R2 = 0x1000d6f48
1000151e0 NOP
1000151e4 MOV    X0, X20           ; --X0 = X20 = 0x0
1000151e8 BL     libobjc.A.dylib::_objc_msgSend ; 0x1000903a4
; [? stringByAppendingString:@"", p_traced"]
```

```
int name[4];
struct kinfo_proc info;
size_t info_size = sizeof(info);
int ret;

info.kp_proc.p_flag = 0;

name[0] = CTL_KERN; // kernel-specific information
name[1] = KERN_PROC; // return a struct with process entries.
name[2] = KERN_PROC_PID; // target process selected based on PID
name[3] = getpid(); // PID of process

if(sysctl(name, 4, &info, &info_size, NULL, 0) == -1){
    return 0;
}
```

sysctl func call
Patch here

Case Study: Bypassing Debugger Checks (p_traced)

```
-> 0x1000e11bc <+232>: bl      0x10015c818      ; symbol stub for: sysctl
    0x1000e11c0 <+236>: cbnz   w0, 0x1000e1220    ; <+332>
    0x1000e11c4 <+240>: ldrb   w8, [sp, #49]
    0x1000e11c8 <+244>: tbz    w8, #3, 0x1000e1220 ; <+332>
(lldb) n
Process 2060 stopped
* thread #1: tid = 0x340a2, 0x00000001000e11c0 SysSecInfo`__lldb_unnamed_function35
  = 'com.apple.main-thread', stop reason = instruction step over
    frame #0: 0x00000001000e11c0 SysSecInfo`__lldb_unnamed_function353$$SysSecInfo
SysSecInfo`__lldb_unnamed_function353$$SysSecInfo:
-> 0x1000e11c0 <+236>: cbnz   w0, 0x1000e1220    ; <+332>
    0x1000e11c4 <+240>: ldrb   w8, [sp, #49]
    0x1000e11c8 <+244>: tbz    w8, #3, 0x1000e1220 ; <+332>
    0x1000e11cc <+248>: ldr    x20, [x19, x23]
(lldb) reg read w0
w0 = 0x00000000
(lldb) reg write w0 1
```

Patch here ←

Case Study: Bypassing Fork Check

```
-[ForkArtefact getFact]:
100015b18 STP X20, X19, [SP,#-32]! ;
100015b1c STP X29, X30, [SP,#16] ;
100015b20 ADD X29, SP, #16 ; $$ R29 = SP + 0x10
100015b24 SUB SP, SP, 16 ; -[ForkArtefact getFact]
100015b28 BL libSystem.B.dylib::$_fork ; 0x1000905a8
100015b2c MOV X19, X0 ; --X19 = X0 = 0x0
100015b30 CMN W19, #1 X0 = 0xffffffffffffffff -|
100015b34 B.EQ 0x100015b60 ;
100015b38 ADR X0, #791856 @"fork allowed" ; ->R0 = 0x10
100015b3c NOP ;
100015b40 BL Foundation::$_NSLog ; 0x100090284
; Foundation::$_NSLog(@"fork allowed");
; // if (R19 == 0) then goto 0x100015b74
100015b44 CBZ X19, 0x100015b74 ;
100015b48 STR X19, [SP, #0] ; *(SP + 0x0) =
100015b4c ADR X0, #791868 @"parent: childid: %d" ; ->R
100015b50 NOP ;
100015b54 BL Foundation::$_NSLog ; 0x100090284
; Foundation::$_NSLog(@"parent: childid: %d");
100015b58 MOVZ W0, 0x0 ; ->R0 = 0x0
100015b5c B 0x100015b64
100015b60 ORR W0, WZR, #0x1 ; ->R0 = 0x1
100015b64 SUB X31, X29, #16 ; SP = R29 - 0x10
100015b68 LDP X29, X30, [SP,#16] ;
100015b6c LDP X20, X19, [SP],#32 ;
100015b70 RET ;
100015b74 MOVZ W0, 0x0 ; ->R0 = 0x0
100015b78 BL libSystem.B.dylib::$_exit ; 0x1000904dc
```

Call to fork
Return value in X0
Patch CMN W19, #1

Case Study: Bypassing Fork Check

```
SysSecInfo`__lldb_unnamed_function371$$SysSecInfo:
```

```
-> 0x100111b30 <+24>: cmn      w19, #1 ← Patch here  
    0x100111b34 <+28>: b.eq    0x100111b60      ; <+72>  
    0x100111b38 <+32>: adr     x0, #791856      ; @"fork allowed"  
    0x100111b3c <+36>: nop
```

```
(lldb) reg read w19  
w19 = 0xffffffff
```

Conclusion

- Common bugs being closed
- A “**new**” approach and break from the norm is required for in depth assessments
- Assembly knowledge a **MUST** for Reversing Engineering
 - Low level assembly allows you to bypass many security protections, discover hidden gems and then some
- Knowledge of iOS architecture will not only improve your assessments but also provide a launching pad for other research
- Disassemblers are your friends (IDA, Hopper, Jtool)
- **Add the reverse engineering skillset to your arsenal !!!**

References

- Books:
 - Mac OS X and iOS Internals To the Apple's Core (Jonathan Levin)
 - The Mobile Application Hacker's Handbook (Dominic Chell, Tyrone Erasmus et al.)
 - Hacking and Securing iOS Applications (Jonathan Zdziarski)
 - iOS Application Security: The Definitive Guide for Hackers and Developers (David Thiel)
- Blogs and Tools:
 - processor_set_tasks() - <http://newosxbook.com/articles/PST2.html>
 - procexp – <http://newosxbook.com/tools/procexp.html>
 - iOSBinaries - <http://newosxbook.com/tools/iOSBinaries.html>
 - jtool - <http://newosxbook.com/tools/jtool.html>
 - filemon - <http://newosxbook.com/tools/filemon.html>
 - AmlBeingDebugged - <https://developer.apple.com/library/mac/qa/qa1361/index.html>
 - Frida - <http://www.frida.re/>
 - Cypcript - <http://www.cypcript.org/>
 - iFunBox - <http://www.i-funbox.com/>
 - SSL Kill Switch – <https://github.com/iSECPartners/ios-ssl-kill-switch>
 - BurpSuite - <https://portswigger.net/burp/>
 - IDA - <https://www.hex-rays.com/products/ida/>
 - Hopper - <https://www.hopperapp.com/>
 - Idb - <http://www.idbtool.com/>
 - PT_DENY_ATTACH - https://www.theiphonewiki.com/wiki/Bugging_Debuggers
 - ARM - <http://infocenter.arm.com/help/index.jsp?topic=/com.arm.doc.den0024a/ch05s01s03.html>
 - SQLite-parser - <https://github.com/mdegrazia/SQLite-Deleted-Records-Parser>
 - SQLite Deletion - <http://www.zdziarski.com/blog/?p=6143>
 - Isdtrip - <http://newosxbook.com/src.jl?tree=listings&file=ls.m#dumpURL>